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ABSTRACT
Power grid stability and security are challenging problems with significant eco-
nomic and social impacts that have been exacerbated in recent years by the increase
in extreme weather events and cyberattack concerns. Recently, networked microgrids
(NMs) have become an emerging paradigm that demonstrates resiliency benefit to
their local customers. U.S. DOE has envisioned that the R&D of NMs will be the
next wave of smart grid research to achieve the nation’s grid modernization vision
towards climate adaptation and resiliency. However, lack of awareness of stability
margin, inadequate capability to respond to grid disturbances, and vulnerabilities
to communication failure, delay, and cyberattacks all contribute to undermining the
capability of NMs to improve distribution grid resiliency.
To tackle these issues, a set of novel methods are devised in the cyber and physical
layers of NMs. First of all, Formal Analysis (FA) via reachable set computation is
established in the physical layer of NMs to efficiently assess their stability in the pres-
ence of heterogeneous uncertainties induced by high penetration of distributed energy
resources (DERs). FA is further combined with quasi-diagonalized Geršgorin theory
to identify systems’ stability margins. Second, based on FA, Distributed Formal
Analysis (DFA) is developed to efficiently investigate the stability of interconnected
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power grids by decoupling large-scale NMs via N + M decomposition approach.
A programmable data exchange mechanism is also developed in DFA to enable a
privacy-preserving approach which helps guarantee the privacy and security of infor-
mation. Third, as an essential function for NM operation, Compositional Power Flow
(ComPF) is devised for assessing steady states of NMs, which for the first time takes
into account power sharing and voltage regulation between microgrids. Fourth, to
quantify unintentional islanding hazards, this dissertation contributes a DER-Driven
Non-Detection Zone (D2NDZ) method, which is a data-driven, learning-based ap-
proach. Beyond the NM physical layer, a Software-Defined Active Synchronous Detec-
tion (SDASD) is designed and implemented in the cyber layer of NMs to protect them
from cyberattacks on Software-Defined Networking (SDN) and power bot attacks on
DERs. Case studies have demonstrated and validated the effectiveness of FA/DFA,
ComPF, D2NDZ, and SDASD in analyzing NM stability under disturbances, quanti-
fying steady state power flows in islanded NMs, determining unintentional islanding
frequencies, and protecting NMs from attacks. The new technologies collectively lead
to a set of powerful tools for planning, operating, and protecting future NMs.
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Microgrid is an emerging and promising paradigm to enhance electricity resiliency for
customers [1]. In the U.S., thousands of major blackouts have occurred in the past
three decades causing over $ 1 trillion damages and enormous social upheavals [2].
Of these outages, over 90% of them occur along electric distribution systems under
extreme weather events [3]. Therefore, a strong consensus across academia [4, 5],
industry [6,7] and government [8] is that enhancing distribution systems resilience is
an important focus of research [1, 9].
Among different solutions, microgrid is, in theory, a potent option to alleviate and
prevent power outages locally because of its capability of autonomous operations, flex-
ibility in accommodating renewable sources and immunity to stormy weather dam-
ages. For instance, our recent research [10, 11] has quantified the resilience ben-
efits of microgrids for hardening the critical infrastructures within 15 Connecticut
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cities/towns under various weather conditions (e.g. major storm, tropical storm,
Categories 1, 2 and 3 storms).
However, a single microgrid can hardly contribute to the resiliency of the main
distribution grid [12], despite the significant resiliency benefit to its local customers.
Networked microgrids (NMs) [13], or coupled microgrids [14], i.e., a cluster of micro-
grids interconnected in close electrical or spatial proximity with coordinated energy
management and interactive supports and exchanges [15,16], can potentially help re-
store neighboring distribution grids after a major blackout. They can significantly im-
prove day-to-day reliability performance, meanwhile impacting the stability of grids.
In fact, the U.S. DOE has envisioned that the R&D of NMs will be the next wave of
smart grid research to achieve the nation’s grid modernization vision towards climate
adaptation and resiliency [13].
Recently, power interchange among NMs is studied aiming at supporting more
customers during islanded situations [17, 18] or reducing power deficiencies in in-
dividual microgrids caused by intermittent renewables [14]. Further, decentralized
dispatch is proposed for the steady-sate operation of NMs [19]. Although promising
results have been achieved for steady state operations, dynamic performance under
grid disturbances and attacks remains an intractable challenge that compromises mi-
crogrid resiliency and thus preventing the wide adoption of NMs, as summarized in
five aspects:
• Centralized stability analysis of NMs under disturbances. There is a
methodological gap in computing security indicators including stability mar-
gin/region for NMs [20]. This challenge originates from the salient features
of microgrids such as uncertainties, non-synchronism, fast ramp rates and low-
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inertia. Therefore, a fundamental question is: How to reliably assess and en-
hance microgrid stability for improving the situational awareness and controlla-
bility in NMs so that they can be used as dependable resiliency resource [21]?
• Decentralized stability analysis of NMs under disturbances. It can
be prohibitively expensive to directly evaluate the stability of a large-scale
system with NMs. Moreover, centralized stability calculation and evaluation
may pose privacy issues when used to integrate customer-owned distributed
energy resources (DERs) or microgrids. A compelling question is: How to dras-
tically reduce computational effort by making full use of distributed computing
resources, meanwhile guaranteeing the privacy and security of information dur-
ing distributed stability analysis?
• Power Flow Calculation of Intentional Island NMs. One fundamental
function for supporting the aforementioned centralized or decentralized NM
stability analysis is power flow calculation which provides the initial statuses
for dynamic simulations. So, an indispensable question is: How to calculate the
power flow of island NMs where a swing bus does not exist anymore; meanwhile,
protect NM data privacy as much as possible?
• Non-Detection Zone Analytics for Unintentional Islanding in Distri-
bution Grids. Power distribution grids in the U.S. are being impacted by the
increasingly deep integration of DERs. The rest of the main distribution grid to
which NMs are connected suffers from safety hazards caused by unintentional
islanding incidents. A major challenge that utility companies face is: How to
efficiently get the possibility of unintentional islanding of a feeder due to the
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integration of DERs, which can create safety hazards for the utility customers
and field crews?
• Detection and defense of cyberattacks on NMs. Since communication
network is indispensable for microgrid stability control, cybersecurity concerns
have become a major hurdle to the wide adoption of NMs. Cyberattacks could
significantly compromise the functionality of microgrid communication network,
which are typical cases of the first generation of cyberattacks on power grids.
Recently, there is an emergence of a second generation of cyberattacks on the
power grids, i.e., the use of power bots which are corrupted power-consuming
or DER devices controlled by remote attackers. An essential problem is: how
to effectively defend against both the first generation of cyberattacks such as
cyberattacks on Software-Defined Networking (SDN) network and the second
generation of cyberattacks such as power bot attack on inverters?
1.2 Outline of the Dissertation
This dissertation aims at closing the knowledge gaps highlighted above so as to enable
reliable NMs for boosting distribution grid resiliency. It will resolve the intractable
problems in integrating scalable microgrids with high penetration of renewable energy
resources. This dissertation is organized as shown in Fig. 1.1 and discussed as follows:
• A centralized Formal Analysis (FA) method is established to tractably
assess NM stability. Modeling and analysis of uncertainties due to high levels
of renewable generation is addressed in Chapter 2. Formal theory is presented
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Fig. 1.1: Organization of the Thesis.
resilience resources. An advanced Geršgorin theory with quasi-diagonalization
technique is then combined with formal theory to identify NM systems’ stability
margins.
• A Distributed Formal Analysis (DFA) method and a Distributed
Quasi-Diagonalized Geršgorin (DQG) theory are devised to efficiently
evaluate stability of large-scale NMs. Based on the centralized FA, DFA is
established in Chapter 3. An N +M decomposition approach is established to
decouple a large-scale NM system and enable distributed reachable set calcula-
tions in parallel. A programmable data exchange mechanism is also developed
to make the DFA a privacy-preserving approach that exchanges only limited in-
formation with neighboring systems. Then, the DQG-enabled DFA is developed
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to estimate the stability margin of a NM system under uncertain conditions.
• A Compositional Power Flow (ComPF) is contributed to calculate
power flow in intentional island NMs. Since power flow calculation is
fundamental in both FA and DFA, in Chapter 4, an advanced-droop-control-
based power flow is designed to supports plug-and-play of microgrids; and an
adaptive-secondary-control-based power flow is developed to resolve the issues
of voltage regulation and power sharing in NMs, and protect data privacy.
• A learning-based, DER-driven non-detection zone (D2NDZ) evalua-
tion method is devised to effectively quantify the unintentional island-
ing risk in distribution networks with the deep integration of DERs.
Different from the intentional islanding in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 discusses unin-
tentional islanding. A rigorous theoretical analysis is used to devise a baseline
NDZ, that is determined by the steady state of a feeder. And then this baseline
is augmented by incorporating the dynamic impacts of DERs.
• A Software-Defined Active Synchronous Detection (SDASD) method
is designed to protect NMs from cyberattacks. Since data transmission
via communication network is essential in the aforementioned distributed cal-
culation (DFA, DQG, ComPF), cybersecurity is an indispensable concern. In
Chapter 6, Software-Defined Networking (SDN) is adopted to enable run-time
programmability and unprecedented flexibility in managing communication net-
works. A HostStatus Checker is designed and embedded in SDN controller to
authenticate the entity of hosts for data communication of NMs. Based on
the secured communication layer, active synchronous detection method is in-
troduced to efficiently detect power bot attacks on DER controllers in NMs
6
without impeding system normal operations.
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Formal Analysis of Networked
Microgrid Dynamics
2.1 Motivation and Challenges
The low inertia nature of power-electronics interfaces of DERs makes microgrids
highly sensitive to disturbances; and thus, deteriorates the stability of microgrids,
even though these interfaces enables high penetration of DERs and flexible dispatch
and control [22]. These disturbances could be uncontrollable external events (e.g.,
grid faults), variation in system structure and parameters (e.g., creation of sub-
microgrids), or disturbances from generation side or consumption (e.g., PV, wind,
electric vehicles), etc. The challenge here is that the above stability issue could
rapidly escalate when microgrids are interconnected. Understanding and quantifying
the transient stability feature of power-electronics-dominated NMs under virtually
infinite number of scenarios is an intractable problem.
11
There exist two major categories of dynamic assessment methods, time domain
simulation and direct methods [23,24], which could also be applicable to NMs. In time
domain simulation, trajectories of state variables are computed based on specified
system structure and initial conditions [25]. This approach is known to be inefficient
in handling parametric or input uncertainties. Although Monte Carlo runs could be
adopted, it is still difficult to verify the infinitely many scenarios that can happen
in a real system [26]. Direct methods can compute regions of attraction which is
unattainable with time domain simulation methods, and can be used to quickly check
if control actions are capable of stabilizing systems. The limitations of direct methods
in assessing NM performance include: (1) the difficulty in constructing an appropriate
Lyapunov function [27] or contraction function [28], (2) significant reduction of system
models resulting in inexact prediction [29,30], and (3) ineffectiveness in dealing with
ubiquitous uncertainties [31, 32]. Besides, numerical solvers for direct methods, e.g.
sum of squares and semi-definite programming [33], are still too complex to be scalable
for NMs.
In order to overcome the limitations of existing methods, a formal analysis (FA)
via reachable set computation is presented in this paper. Specifically, small signal
stability under different disturbances is analyzed to efficiently assess the stability of
NMs. FA is further combined with a quasi-diagonalization-based Geršgorin theory to
efficiently probe the boundary of the stability region subject to uncertainties [34–36].
The novelties of the FA method are threefold:
• It is an on-the-fly solution that directly obtains possible operation ranges for
NMs subject to disturbances.
• FA provides reachable set information that pinpoints critical disturbances and
12
is useful for predictive control and dispatch to enhance NM stability.
• The reachable set results can be used to accurately estimate the stability margin
of NMs under uncertainties.
These salient features make FA a powerful tool beyond direct methods and time
domain simulations while incorporating the benefits of both.
2.2 Formal Analysis via Reachable Set
FA aims at finding the bounds of all possible system trajectories under various dis-
turbances. Mathematically, the aim is to find a reachable set, where one viable
solution can be presented as follows: first, the original nonlinear differential-algebraic
equations (DAEs) of a dynamic system are abstracted into linear differential inclu-
sions at each time step, obtaining a finite-dimensional state matrix of the system
A = [aij] ∈ Rn×n. Its reachability analysis under uncertainties can then be expressed
as follows:
∆ẋ ∈ A∆x⊕P, (2.1)
where ∆x = x− x0, x0 is the operation point where the system is linearized, P is a
set of uncertain inputs which can be formulated using a set-based approach, and ⊕
is Minkowski addition.
Second, a reachable set can be obtained at each simulation time step via a closed-
form solution [34,35]:
Re(tk+1) = φ(A, r)Re(tk)⊕Ψ(A, r,p0)⊕ Iep(p∆, r), (2.2)
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Re(τk) = C(Re(tk), φ(A, r)Re(tk)⊕Ψ(A, r,p0))⊕ Iep(p∆, r)⊕ Ieξ , (2.3)
where Re(tk+1) is the reachable set at each time step, Re(τk) is the reachable set
during time steps, φ(A, r) represents how the history reachable set Re(tk) contributes
to the current one, as expressed in (2.4), Ψ(A, r,p0) and I
e
p(p∆, r) represent the
increment of reachable set caused by deterministic inputs p0 and uncertain ones p∆,
as expressed in (2.5) and (2.6), respectively, Ieξ represents increment in reachable set
caused by curvature of trajectories from tk to tk+1, as shown in (2.7), r = tk+1− tk is
the time interval, and C(·) represents convex hull calculation [34].













































order η [34]. And X(A, r), I, Ĩ involved in (2.5)-(2.7) are given as follows:































If necessary, the over-approximation of the reachable set along the time inter-
val can be minimized using advanced techniques such as reachable set splitting or
optimality-based bounds tightening, as detailed in [37,38].
2.3 Quasi-Diagonalized Geršgorin Theory
We devise an enhanced Geršgorin theory for estimating the eigenvalues of a dynamical
system under disturbances, which will be used for the stability margin estimation.
The eigenvalue problem at each time step, which reflects the small signal stability





where λi is the i
th generalized eigenvalue of the system;vi and u
T
i are the i
th right
and left eigenvector, respectively, satisfying the orthogonal normalization conditions
as shown in (2.12). 
uTi vj = δij
uTi Avj = δijλi
(2.12)
where δij is the Kronecker sign.
Instead of calculating the exact eigenvalues, based on the state matrix A, the
eigenvalue range can be estimated using the Geršgorin disk and set via the following
Geršgorin theorem [39,40]. The reason is that the calculation of exact eigenvalues is
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tedious, time-consuming, and not always necessary especially when a system is far
away from its stability margin.
Geršgorin Theorem: For any nonsingular finite-dimensional matrix A with λi as
its ith eigenvalue, there is a positive integer k in N=1,2,. . . ,n such that,






|akj|. If σ(A) denotes a set of all eigenvalues of A, then σ(A)
satisfies the following condition




where Γ(A) is the Geršgorin set of nonsingular matrix A, Γk(A) is the k
th Geršgorin
disk, and can be expressed as Γk(A)
.
= {|x− akk| ≤ rk(A), x ∈ R}.
When the state matrix is not strongly diagonally dominant, the estimation of
eigenvalue distribution is usually over-approximated. Therefore, a quasi-diagonalized
Geršgorin is established as follows to reduce the conservativeness of the conventional
Geršgorin theory and to improve the estimation accuracy of eigenvalue distributions.
Taking into account the orthogonal normalization conditions shown in (2.12), the
state matrix A under system disturbances can be quasi-diagonalized as follows:
UT0 AV0 = U
T
0 A0V0 + U
T
0 APV0 = S0 + SP , (2.15)
where A0 is the system state matrix at (x0,y0); S0, U
T
0 and V0 are the corresponding
eigenvalue matrix, left eigenvector matrix, and right eigenvector matrix at (x0,y0),
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respectively; AP is the increment of state matrix under disturbances, which is con-
structed based on a bounded set of uncertainties; SP is the increment of eigenvalue
matrix. Thus, the eigenvalue problem of a disturbed system is transformed to the
analysis of the matrix SP , and the following expression can be obtained:
Γk(SP ) = {|x− skk| ≤ rk(SP ), x ∈ R}, (2.16)






Therefore, the distribution of each eigenvalue in a system under uncertainties can
be expressed as a Geršgorin disk with S0 as its center and Γk(SP ) as its corresponding
area.
2.4 Formal Analysis in NMs
NMs as a system can be modeled as a set of semi-explicit, index-1, nonlinear DAEs





where x ∈ Rn is the state variable vector, y ∈ Rm is the algebraic variable vector,
p ∈ Rp is the disturbance vector, which will be formulated using a set-based approach.
Linearizing the NM system at the operation point (x0,y0,p0) [34], one can obtain
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the following equations, when the high-order Taylor expansion is neglected.






















where Fx = ∂F/∂x is the partial derivative matrix of differential equations with re-
spect to state variables, Fy = ∂F/∂y is the partial derivative matrix of differential
equations with respect to algebraic variables, Fp = ∂F/∂p is the partial derivative
matrix of differential equations with respect to disturbance variables, Gx = ∂G/∂x
is the partial derivative matrix of algebraic equations with respect to state variables,
Gy = ∂G/∂y is the partial derivative matrix of algebraic equations with respect to
algebraic variables, Gp = ∂G/∂p is the partial derivative matrix of algebraic equa-
tions with respect to disturbance variables. When Gy is nonsingular, the following
equation can be obtained [34].
∆ẋ = [Fx − FyG−1y Gx]∆x + [Fp − FyG−1y Gp]∆p. (2.20)
Therefore, with linearization, a state matrix can be obtained at each time step.
ANMG = Fx − FyG−1y Gx, (2.21)
where, ANMG is equivalent to A in (2.1) and Geršgorin Theorem, [Fp−FyG−1y Gp]∆p
is equivalent to P in (2.1).
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2.4.1 Modeling Disturbances in NMs
The key to formal analysis is to properly model uncertain inputs. Instead of using the
traditional point-based methods, a set-based approach (e.g., with zonotope, ellipsoid,
polytopes) is adopted to better quantify these uncertainties [34]. Zonotopes are rec-
ommended because they are computationally both efficient and stable, closed under
Minkowski operations, and suitable for convex hull computations and convex opti-
mization. Moreover, those ‘unknown but bounded’ intervals, polytopes, and ellipsoids
based uncertainties in NMs can be easily converted to zonotopes.
A zonotope P is usually parameterized by a center and generators as shown in
Fig. 2.1 [34,35], and is modeled in (2.22).
c ⊕ g1
center
c ⊕ g1⊕ g2




Fig. 2.1: Concept of zonotope.
P = {c +
m∑
i=1
βigi | βi ∈ [−1, 1]}, (2.22)
where c ∈ Rn is the center and gi ∈ Rn are generators.
Therefore, by using (2.22), the uncertain input P in (2.1) can be expressed in a
zonotope. For more accurate characterization of uncertainties, polynomial zonotypes
and probabilistic zonotypes can be used [34].
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2.4.2 Impact of Disturbances on the State Matrix
To calculate the reachable set, the state matrix needs to be updated at each time step,
which is computationally expensive. Since only a few elements of the state matrix
change as the disturbance happens, intuitively, this feature offers an option to update
the state matrix in an efficient way, i.e., only re-calculating the affected elements.
Therefore, we decompose the entire state matrix into two parts: submatrices corre-
lated to disturbances and constant submatrices which do not change once the state
matrix is built up. The following (2.23) is given as an example to show the impact
of disturbances from DERs, loads, and the power exchange of each microgrid at the





















where NNMG is the number of microgrids, NG is the number of DERs in one microgrid,
NL is the number of loads in one microgrid, Ai is the increment of state matrix in






i are the increments only correlated to DERs, loads,
power exchange at PCC in the ith microgrid, and the cross items AG,L,Ei represent





x − FGjy G−1y GGjx − FGjy G−1y GCx − FCy G−1y GGjx ,
ALki = F
Lk
x − FLky G−1y GLkx − FLky G−1y GCx − FCy G−1y GLkx ,
AEi = F
E
x − FEy G−1y GEx − FEy G−1y GCx − FCy G−1y GEx ,
A
Gj ,Lk




i = −FGjy G−1y GEx − FEy G−1y GGjx ,














x are matrices only related to the uncertainties from the jth DER




x are matrices only related to the changes of the




x are matrices only related to the disturbances




x are constant matrices uncorrelated with
any disturbances.
The above decomposition has the following advantages:
• It becomes easy and efficient to calculate the increment AP when disturbances
occur, because only specific sub-matrices need to be updated.
• It provides an efficient tool to analyze the impacts of disturbances. For instance,
it can be clearly observed from (2.23) that the increment of the state matrix
can be expressed in the form of a combination of disturbances, which makes it
easier to analyze the impact of a specific disturbance.
• In particular, it can seamlessly combine with zonotope modeling. After calcu-
lating zonotopes of sub-matrices, we can efficiently update the zonotope of AP
which can be subsequently applied in the quasi-diagonalized Geršgorin Theorem
to get Geršgorin disks.
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2.5 Stability Margin Estimation via FA Integrated
with Enhanced Geršgorin Theorem
When reachable sets are obtained via FA, it is still necessary to know how far an NM
system is from its stability margin, especially when the system is operating in the
islanding mode. First, it is important to ensure a sufficient stability margin exists in
the system at all times. Second, predictive control or dispatch can be performed in
advance if the system is found approaching its stability margin. Third, only when
NMs have sufficient stability margins, they can serve as resiliency sources to actively
and coordinately provide ancillary services that stabilize, restore, or black start the
main grid.
FA integrated with the quasi-diagonalized Geršgorin theory offers an option to
effectively calculate and analyze stability margins for an NM system. The analysis
procedure is presented as follows: first, FA is used to calculate the reachable set
Re(tk) of a system under disturbances. The edge of the reachable set is then extracted
for quasi-diagonalized Geršgorin calculation by using (2.15) and (2.16). Finally, the
corresponding Geršgorin disk is sequentially evaluated to assess the stability condition
under disturbances. The procedures of stability margin calculation and analysis via
FA integrated with quasi-diagonalized Geršgorin Theorem are illustrated in Fig. 2.2.
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Fig. 2.2: Flowchart of reachable set calculation and stability margin evaluation.
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In Fig. 2.2, an NM system including feeder sections, transformers, and loads is
initially modeled, and the dynamics of power-electronic-interfaces and DERs are then
formulated via a set of differential equations. A typical power-electronic-interfaced
microgrid is shown in the Appendix. After that, power flow is formulated and cal-
culated, where an extended admittance matrix-based method is adopted to simplify
the calculation process. The extended admittance matrix method is introduced as
follows:
2.5.1 Extended Admittance Matrix-based Power Flow
Assume the admittance between node i and node j is Yij = |Yij| cos(αij)+j|Yij| sin(αij).
The power injection from node i to node j can then be expressed as:
Pij = ViVj|Yij| cos(θi − θj − αij), (2.24)
Qij = ViVj|Yij| sin(θi − θj − αij), (2.25)
where Vi, Vj are the voltage amplitudes at the node i and node j, θi, θj are the voltage
angles at the node i and node j, |Yij| is the absolute value of the branch admittance
between the node i and node j, and αij is the corresponding angle of the branch
admittance.
Then the power flow equation can be expressed as follows:
|Yij| cos(θi − θj − αij)










 = Y ·V◦V+SG−SL = 0,
(2.26)
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where ◦ is the Hadamard product, PGij , QGij are the active and reactive power injection
from DERs to the node j, and PLij , Q
L
ij are the active and reactive power load at the
node j.
The advantages of the extended admittance matrix-based power flow formulation
include:
• The admittance is formulated in modules, which enables ‘plug and play’ and
easy removal of components such as DERs or even microgrids.
• It offers an option to directly analyze the impact of uncertainties on power flow
results. For instance, when PGij , Q
G
ij are expressed in zonotopes, (2.26) will give
power flow zonotopes that enclose the effects of disturbances.
2.5.2 Reachable Set and Stability Margin Calculation
After the power flow is calculated, system linearization can be conducted via (2.19),
based on which reachable set can be calculated via (2.2) and (2.3). When the reach-
able set at tk+1 is obtained, the quasi-diagonalized Geršgorin Theorem is used to
estimate the eigenvalue distribution at the edge of the reachable set. The analysis
process is given as follows:
• If the following stability criterion (i) is satisfied, it means the study system
is stable; otherwise, the system may not be stable, and a QR analysis will be
performed to calculate the exact eigenvalues to validate the stability.
smaxkk + r
max
k (SP ) ≤ α0 (Stability criterion (i)), (2.27)
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where smaxkk is the center of Geršgorin disk which is located in the rightest hand,
rmaxk (SP ) is the corresponding radius, and α0 is the given threshold.
• If the study system is stable, disturbances will be enlarged in order to get
the stability margin. After setting new disturbances, the reachable set will be
calculated correspondingly and Geršgorin estimation will be conducted as well
to evaluate the stability again.
• If the stability criterion (i) is not satisfied, after calculating the exact eigenval-
ues, stability criterion (ii) will be used to evaluate the stability.
αmax ≤ α0 (Stability criterion (ii)), (2.28)
where αmax is the real part of the maximum eigenvalue.
• The evaluation process will be terminated when the simulation time ends or the
system is always unstable after a given simulation steps. If one of these criteria
is satisfied, then stop; otherwise continue power flow calculation and reachable
set computation.
Therefore, the presented quasi-diagonalized Geršgorin theory enables efficient
eigenvalues estimation of dynamic systems under disturbances. Specifically, if we
adopt the exact calculation method, each time a disturbance happens, state matrix
update, Householder transformation, Hessenberg matrix formation, QR decomposi-
tion, etc. [41], need to be conducted to calculate the exact eigenvalues. In contrast,
by using the proposed quasi-diagonalized Geršgorin theory, only the increment of
the state matrix shown in (23) needs to be calculated. Thus, eigenvalues can be
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efficiently estimated via (15)-(17), which makes the above complex procedures of ex-
act eigenvalue calculation unnecessary. Besides, oftentimes we do not need to know
the exact eigenvalues. For instance, if the largest eigenvalue approximated through
quasi-diagonalized Geršgorin theory is located on the left half plane and far away from
y-axis, it means the system is absolutely stable, because quasi-diagonalized Geršgorin
results must cover all possible eigenvalues; thus, it indicates there is no need to obtain
the exact eigenvalues to figure out the stability of a dynamic system.
Note that the system’s stability is assessed via eigenvalue locations at reachable
points per request, which may result in a conservative evaluation. The reasons in-
clude: (i) system linearization may introduce errors even the eigenvalues are exactly
calculated through QR algorithm, and (ii) each reachable point is treated as an equi-
librium point, which may lead to a conservative result. Thus, this is a limitation to
be overcome in the future. One possible solution is to combine the presented FA with
the time domain stability approaches introduced in [42].
2.6 Test and Validation of FA
A typical NM system shown in Fig. 2.3 is used to test and validate the presented FA
approach integrated with quasi-diagonalized Geršgorin Theorem. The NM system is
assumed to operate in island mode to better illustrate the impact of disturbances. The
test system includes six microgrids. Microgrid 1 is powered by a small conventional
generator represented by a classical synchronous generator [34], controlling the voltage
and frequency in the system. The other microgrids are power-electronic-dominant
systems equipped with inverters and their controller using power control strategy as
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Fig. 2.3: A typical NM system.
The system in Fig. 2.3 has a 36 × 18 extended admittance matrix Y when it is
operated in the islanded mode. The dimensions of the node voltage vector V, the
extended node voltage vector V, and node power vector SG,SL are 18 × 1, 36 × 1,
36× 1 and 36× 1, respectively. Parameters for microgrid controllers are summarized
in the Appendix while those of the backbone system can be found in [43]. The FA
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algorithms are developed on the basis of multiple functions in the CORA toolbox [44].
The simulation step size is set to 0.010s.
2.6.1 Reachable Set Calculation via FA
2.6.1.1 Reachable Set Calculation
In this test, the active power output in Microgrid 6 fluctuates around its baseline
power by ±5%,±10%,±15% and ±20%. Under these uncertainties, the reachable
sets of Xpi, Xqi in Microgrids 6, 2 and 5 are given in Figs. 2.4, 2.6 and 2.8, and
Figs. 2.5, 2.7 and 2.9 show the cross sectional views of reachable set along the time
line. Here Xpi is the state variable in the upper proportional-integral block, whereas
Xqi is the state variable in the lower proportional-integral block (see the Appendix),
which are the key variables to control inverter.
    20% Uncertainty
    15% Uncertainty
    10% Uncertainty
      5% Uncertainty
 
Fig. 2.4: 3-D reachable set of Xpi, Xqi in Microgrid 6.
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Fig. 2.5: Reachable set of Xpi, Xqi in Microgrid 6 projected to the time line.
    20% Uncertainty
    15% Uncertainty
    10% Uncertainty
      5% Uncertainty
 
Fig. 2.6: 3-D reachable set of Xpi, Xqi in Microgrid 2.
It can be seen that:
• The possible operation range of an NM system under disturbances can be di-
rectly obtained via reachable set calculation. The simulation time is equivalent




Fig. 2.7: Reachable set of Xpi, Xqi in Microgrid 2 projected to the time line.
• The sizes of zonotopes along reachtubes increase as the uncertainty level in-
creases. Its correctness and over-approximation are further demonstrated by
the comparison with time domain simulations.
• The results in Fig. 2.4 and Fig. 2.5 show that the reachable sets pertaining
to Microgrid 6 are converging rather than consistently increasing along the
timeline. The reason is that Microgrids 6 is electrically close to Microgrid 1
which consists of a synchronous generator. Thus, the impact of uncertainties
are alleviated by the inertia in Microgrid 1.
• The reactive power output of microgrids is impacted considerably by the fluc-
tuations in active power, even when the changes in active power are very small.
This is largely attributed to the presence of resistances in the backbone feed-
ers [45].
• The comparison between Fig. 2.6 and Fig. 2.8 shows that the impact of distur-
bances in Microgrid 6 have less impact on the dynamics of Microgrid 5 than
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those of Microgrid 2, because Microgrid 5 is electrically the farthest one from Mi-
crogrid 6. For instance, according to Fig. 2.7 and Fig. 2.9, at 1.5s, the deviations
of Xpi and Xqi in Microgrid 2 under 20% disturbance are [−1.95%, 1.64%] and
[−7.18%, 4.65%], whereas those deviations in Microgrid 5 are [−1.20%, 1.01%]
and [−2.78%, 1.86%] which are smaller than those in the Microgrid 2.
    20% Uncertainty
    15% Uncertainty
    10% Uncertainty
      5% Uncertainty
 
Fig. 2.8: 3-D reachable set of Xpi, Xqi in Microgrid 5.
 
Fig. 2.9: Reachable set of Xpi, Xqi in Microgrid 5 projected to the time line.
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2.6.1.2 Reachable Set Verification via Time Domain Simulations
Time domain simulations are used to verify the effectiveness of FA. For clear illus-
tration, ten simulation trajectories are selected to compare against the FA results.
Fig. 2.10 shows the simulation results of Xpi and Xqi. It can be observed that:
 
Fig. 2.10: Time domain simulation verification.
• The time domain trajectories are fully enclosed by reachable sets, which vali-
dates the over-approximation capability of FA.
• In this test case, the conservativeness of reachable sets is acceptable and actually
desirable; however, when the system scale increases drastically, techniques to
reduce conservativeness such as set splitting or optimality-based bounds tight-
ening may become necessary.
2.6.1.3 Efficiency of FA
The computation times for the ten time domain simulations versus reachable set cal-
culation are given in Table 2.1, which validate FA is an efficient approach in analyzing
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system dynamics under uncertainties.




20% 15% 10% 5%
FA Time (s) 8.3311 8.1483 7.6262 7.6025
Time Domain Simulation Time (s) 6.4853 6.1576 6.4217 6.3235
2.6.1.4 Simulation Step Size Discussion
Since the NM is a nonlinear system, step size will affect the FA accuracy. Fig. 2.11
shows the comparison of Xpi in Microgrid 6 between different step sizes when ±20%
active power uncertainty happens in Microgrid 6, and offers the following findings:
 
Fig. 2.11: FA results comparison between different step sizes.
• When the time step is set as 0.001s, a relatively accurate result can be obtained;
but it takes much longer time to finish the FA calculation.
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• As the step size increases, the simulation time decreases, and so does the calcu-
lation accuracy. Table 2.2 summarizes the calculation time using different step
sizes.
• When the step size is set as 0.015s, the simulation process suspends after 15
steps, because the matrix Gy is close to singular or badly scaled; and thus,
results may be inaccurate. Especially, when the time step reaches 0.05s, the
simulation process stops after only three steps.
• Assume the result of 0.001s time step is accurate, the relative errors of the other
time steps at 1.0s are given in Table 2.2.
• Therefore, more accurate results can be obtained by using a very small sim-
ulation step, e.g., 0.001s; however, it is very time consuming. On the other
hand, an excessively large simulation step may accelerate FA calculation at the
expense of inaccurate results or even halt. Thus, taking into account the simu-
lation time and calculation accuracy, the step size of 0.010s is selected for both
efficient and accurate stability evaluation.
Table 2.2: Calculation Time and Relative Errors Using Different Simulation Step Sizes







2.6.2 Stability Margin Calculation via FA and Quasi-diagonalized
Geršgorin Theorem
2.6.2.1 Stability Margin Calculation
This case demonstrates the usefulness of quasi-diagonalized Geršgorin Theorem in
evaluating the stability margins at different time points. Fig. 2.12 shows the stability
margin of Microgrid 6 at 0.5s; Figs. 2.13–2.14 illustrate the corresponding Geršgorin
disks at vertices A and B in Fig. 2.12 with exact eigenvalues given as well. It can be
seen that:
Stability Margin













Fig. 2.12: Stability margin of Microgrid 6 at 0.5s.
• The stability margin can be efficiently obtained, which verifies the feasibility of
FA and quasi-diagonalized Geršgorin Theorem.






Fig. 2.13: Geršgorin disks and eigenvalues of point A.
the system operation point is far away from its stability margin, e.g., the point
A in Fig. 2.12. It makes exact eigenvalue calculation unnecessary.
• When the system is approaching its stability margin, results from quasi-diagonalized
Geršgorin can be conservative (e.g., the point B’s stability results shown in
Fig. 2.14), and thus, exact eigenvalue inspection is needed.
• Eigenvalue results show that there exist three groups of dynamic modes, i.e.,
‘less stable modes’, ‘stable modes’, and ‘highly stable modes’ as show in Figs. 2.13
and 2.14. Since eigenvalues of less stable modes dominate the system’s dynam-
ics, attention should be paid to the Geršgorin disks calculation in this area, as






Fig. 2.14: Geršgorin disks and eigenvalues of point B.
2.6.2.2 Efficiency of Quasi-diagonalized Geršgorin Theorem
According to Fig. 2.2, quasi-diagonalized Geršgorin Theorem based eigenvalue esti-
mation will be performed until stability criterion (i) is not met. In the worst case,
exact eigenvalue is calculated at each time step, which takes 29.8990s. However, the
quasi-diagonalized Geršgorin Theorem based evaluation only takes 17.1653s, which is
only 57.41% of the time used in the exact eigenvalue calculation case. The compu-
tational time comparison validates the quasi-diagonalized Geršgorin Theorem is an
efficient approach in evaluating system stability under uncertainties.
2.6.2.3 Applications of FA in NM Operation
One of the operators’ concerns in operating an NM system is how to reliably assess
its stability for improving the situational awareness and controllability so that it can
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be used as dependable resiliency resource. The FA results on stability margin enable
operators to take the following actions:
• Forecast and monitor NM performance, so that the operators can have a better
understanding about the dynamics of an NM system under high-penetration of
renewable generation.
• Perform predictive control or dispatch in advance if the system is found ap-
proaching its stability margin, e.g., point B in Fig. 2.12, such that the stability
and resiliency of the NM system can be significantly improved.
• Pinpoint the critical components or controls of an NM system (e.g. those with
high trajectory sensitivities), which inform the operator the most cost-effective
measures to enlarge stability region of microgrids.
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Chapter 3
Distributed Formal Analysis of
Power Networks with Deep
Integration of Distributed Energy
Resources
3.1 Motivation and Challenges
Although formal analysis has emerged as an alternative and promising solution for
the stability analysis of dynamic systems [46–48], and can be applied to identifications
of stability regions [46], control verification [47], and transient stability analysis [48],
cyber-security [49], and load flow calculation [50], centralized formal analysis could
be prohibitively expensive to directly evaluate the stability of a large-scale or config-
urable NM system with massive DERs. Moreover, centralized stability calculation and
evaluation may pose privacy issues when used to integrate customer-owned DERs or
microgrids [51, 52]. Efficiently analyzing the stability of a large-scale microgrid sys-
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tem and protecting the privacy of information involved in calculation is an urgent
problem.
Distributed formal analysis (or compositional formal analysis) is presented in [34,
48]. As mentioned in [34], two compositional techniques are available. One is to com-
positionally compute the set of linearization errors, while abstracting the dynamics
to linear differential inclusions using the full model as shown in [34]. The other is to
split a large-scale interconnected grid into subsystems for which the reachable sets
are computed separately as presented in [48].
Multiple decomposition techniques are studied to decouple a large-scale system
for distributed calculation. A coherency-based decomposition method was proposed
in [53] to decouple slow electromechanical oscillations from fast ones, in order to study
the inter-area mode oscillation phenomenon. However, oscillation modes are very sim-
ilar among DERs or microgrids [54]. A hierarchical spectral clustering methodology
was adopted in [55] to reveal the internal connectivity structure of a power transmis-
sion system, in order to properly partition a large-scale system. However, it needs
to calculate the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of a matrix correlated to the network,
which significantly increases the computational burden and highly limits the wide use
of this method. A multi-area Thévenin equivalent circuit approach was used in [56],
which focuses more on optimally dividing the computation among several processors.
A waveform relaxation method was used in [57] for transient stability simulations,
where subsystems’ information is still shared between them. In summary, none of
them can be effectively used in DER-dominated power networks to solve the above-
mentioned stability issue.
In order to overcome the limitations of existing techniques, a scalable privacy-
preserving distributed formal analysis (DFA) approach using reachable sets and a
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distributed quasi-diagonalized Geršgorin (DQG) theory are presented to efficiently
analyze the stability of interconnected power systems under disturbances with a focus
on large-scale NMs. Specifically, small signal stability under different disturbances is
investigated. The novelties of the proposed DFA are summarized as follows:
• An N +M decomposition approach is established to decouple a large-scale net-
worked system and enable distributed reachable set calculations in parallel. It
is a microgrid-dominant decomposition only with power injection exchanged
between microgrids and the power backbone, which cannot be realized via pre-
vious techniques. Thus, not only it renders central coordination unnecessary,
but also can make full use of distributed computing resources and drastically
reduce computational efforts.
• A programmable data exchange mechanism is developed to make the DFA
a privacy-preserving approach that exchanges only limited information with
neighboring systems, which has not been considered previously. Therefore, it
can help guarantee the privacy and security of information among neighboring
systems.
• DFA can efficiently obtain the possible operation ranges of a NM system under
disturbances, rather than repeatedly simulating and analyzing the system with
on-going disturbances.
• The DFA enables the plug-and-play of subsystems (e.g., distribution feeders or
microgrids), meaning a subsystem can be easily integrated into or disconnected
from an existing system. This function enables DFA to evaluate the stability
of a configurable power network online, which cannot be realized via previous
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techniques.
• DQG-enabled DFA is able to estimate the stability margin of a NM system
under uncertain conditions.
3.2 Distributed Formal Analysis via Reachable Set
Calculation
DFA aims to find the bounds of all possible system trajectories under various distur-
bances. In this work, we use reachability analysis to bound all solutions. Typically,
reachable sets are computed for short time intervals τk = [tk, tk+1], where tk and tk+1
are time steps.
Assuming that a large-scale system is decomposed into several small subsystems,
the reachable sets of the overall interconnected system can be obtained based on the
results from each subsystem as shown in (3.1) and (3.2) [34,48].
Res(tk+1) = ϕ1Re1(tk+1)× ϕ2Re2(tk+1)× · · · × ϕN+MReN+M(tk+1), (3.1)
Res(τk) = ϕ1Re1(τk)× ϕ2Re2(τk)× · · · × ϕN+MReN+M(τk), (3.2)
where Res(tk+1) is the reachable set at time steps, Res(τk) is the reachable set during
time intervals, both for the overall system, N + M is the number of subsystems, ×
is the Cartesian product, Rei (tk+1) is the reachable set of the ith subsystem at time
steps, Rei (τk) is the reachable set of the ith subsystem during time intervals, ϕi is a
matrix of ones and zeros, mapping the local states of the ith subsystem to the states
of the overall system. Calculation details of reachable sets Rei (tk+1) and Rei (τk) can
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be found in (2.2) and (2.3).
3.3 Distributed Quasi-Diagonalized Geršgorin The-
ory
An enhanced DQG theory is established to evaluate the stability margin. Assuming
again that the large-scale system is decomposed into several small subsystems, the
Geršgorin sets of the overall interconnected system can be obtained based on the
results from each subsystem as shown in (3.3) and (3.4).
Γ(SP) = ϕ1Γ(S1,P)× ϕ2Γ(S2,P)× · · · × ϕnΓ(Sn,P), (3.3)
σ(SP) = ϕ1σ(S1,P)× ϕ2σ(S2,P)× · · · × ϕnσ(Sn,P), (3.4)
where Γ(SP) and σ(SP) are the Geršgorin disk and sets of the overall system, Γ(Si,P)
and σ(Si,P) are the Geršgorin disk and sets of the i
th subsystem, × is Cartesian
product and ϕi is the mapping matrix which is the same with that in (3.1) and (3.2).
Calculation details of Geršgorin disk and sets in each subsystem can be found in
(2.16) and (2.17).
3.4 Partitioning Large-Scale Power Networks with
Distributed Energy Resources
It can be computationally expensive to directly implement formal analysis on a large-
scale networked system. Therefore, grid decomposition offers a solution for scalable
DFA.
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3.4.1 N +M Decomposition
An N+M decomposition method is presented to partition a large-scale power network
into several smaller subsystems. Subsystems are coupled by power injection [58, 59],
as shown in Fig. 3.1 (a).
Microgrid 2 




















































Fig. 3.1: Concept of power network partition using N +M decomposition.
Based on whether a subsystem integrates DERs, the original large-scale power
network can be divided into N + M subsystems, as shown in Fig. 3.1 (b), where N
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is the number of active subsystems (i.e., energized by DERs), and M is the number
of passive subsystems (i.e., power backbone).
Then by using the N + M decomposition technique, the power flow equation of
an overall power network can be rewritten as follows:
Yext ·Vext ◦Vext + SGext − SLext − SIext = 0, (3.5)
where ◦ is the Hadamard product ((A ◦ B)ij = [aij · bij], aij ∈ A, bij ∈ B). The other
variables in (3.5) are introduced as follows:
3.4.1.1 Extended admittance matrix
In (3.5), Yext is the extended admittance matrix under system partitions as shown
in (3.6), where Y11, · · · ,YNN are the extended admittance matrices correlated to the
active subsystems, and YN+1,N+1, · · · ,YN+M,N+M are the extended admittance
matrices correlated to the passive subsystems. The entries of Yii are shown in (3.7).
Yext =








0 · · · YNN 0 · · · 0













|y11| cos β11 |y12| cos β12 · · · |y1k| cos β1k





|yk1| cos βk1 |yk2| cos βk2 · · · |ykk| cos βkk
|y11| sin β11 |y12| sin β12 · · · |y1k| sin β1k





|yk1| sin βk1 |yk2| sin βk2 · · · |ykk| sin βkk

, (3.7)
where the admittance between the node l and node k is expressed as ylk = |ylk| cosαlk+
j|ylk| sinαlk, |ylk| is the absolute value of the branch admittance, αlk is the correspond-
ing angle of the branch admittance, βlk = θl−θk−αlk, and θl, θk are the voltage angles
at the node l and node k, respectively.
3.4.1.2 Extended voltage vectors
In (3.5), Vext is the bus voltage vector after system partition as shown in (3.8), Vext
is the extended bus voltage vector as shown in (3.9).
Vext =
[




 V11, V11, · · · ,VNN ,




where V11, · · · ,VNN are the voltage vectors in the active subsystems, and VN+1,N+1, · · · ,
VN+M,N+M are the voltage vectors in the passive subsystems.
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3.4.1.3 Extended power vectors
In (3.5), SGext is the vector showing power injections from DERs to active subsystems;
SLext is the vector of power loads in each subsystem; and S
I
ext is the vector of exchange
power on the interfaces between subsystems and has the following properties:
• When line loss is considered during calculation, SIext,i and SI
′
ext,i in Fig. 3.1 (b)
are different; otherwise, they are the same.
• Some of the entries in SIext are correlated with others, which means they need
to be updated together at each time step. This issue is solved by the proposed
status flag method.
3.4.2 Partitioning Large-scale Power Networks
Because DERs are not supposed to appear in passive susbsystems under the N +M
decomposition, the entries in SGext correlated to the passive subsystems is zero. Then,
the algebraic equations of the overall system can be rewritten as follows:

Ykk ·Vkk ◦Vkk + SGkk − SLkk − SIkk = 0
Yjj ·Vjj ◦Vjj − SLjj − SIjj = 0,
(3.10)
where k = 1, · · · , N , j = N + 1, · · · , N +M .
From (3.10), it can be seen that the admittance matrix of the original entire system
is fully decoupled into several independent sub-matrices, because of the introduction
of equivalent power injections on the interfaces between subsystems. Therefore, the
calculation of SIext is essential.
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3.5 Implementation of DQG-Based DFA in Power
Networks
3.5.1 Procedure of Calculation
Our overall procedure for DQG-based DFA is presented in Fig. 3.2. Initially, the N +
M decomposition is used to partition an interconnected power network into several
subsystems. The set of power flow in each subsystem is calculated in parallel based
on data exchange between subsystems. Next, subsystems’ linearization is conducted
via (2.19).
Start
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Fig. 3.2: Flowchart of DFA calculation.
Then, the DQG-based DFA can be implemented, which involves the following
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steps:
• DFA is used to computed the reachable sets of subsystems’ states based on
interface data exchanged between subsystems. If the reachable sets on the
interfaces converge, the overall reachable set can be obtained based on (3.1)
and (3.2). Otherwise, the power flow is updated and reachable sets in each
subsystem are re-computed. More details about reachable sets calculation can
be found in [34].
• DQG is sequentially used on the edges of reachable sets to calculate Geršgorin
disks.
• Geršgorin disks are then evaluated to assess the stability condition of the overall
system under disturbances.
3.5.2 Distributed Algorithm and Data Exchange in DFA
Two nested iterations are used in the distributed algorithm, where the inner loop
solves power flow or computes reachable sets in each subsystem while the outer loop
updates exchange power until the stopping criterion is met. The overall iteration
process is terminated when one of the following two criteria is satisfied:




where ∆ski = Yki ·Vki◦Vki−Yki ·VPki◦VPki is the change of power exchange between






i ] is the voltage vector at the previous step, εo is a given threshold of
the outer loop iteration, Lo is the iteration number, and Iter
max
o is the given upper
limit of iteration number.
3.5.2.1 Distributed Algorithm
The power transferred through coupling lines is exchanged among two neighboring




jj in (3.10). Specifically, they
are updated based on the interface voltage of their neighboring subsystems, as shown
in (3.13), where the power flow calculation in the passive subsystem j is given as an
example: 
Yjj ·Vjj ◦Vjj − SLjj − SIjj = 0
SIjj = Yji ·Vji ◦Vji,
(3.13)
where Yji is the admittance matrix of the interface branch between subsystem j
and its neighboring subsystem i, the expression of Yji can be derived via (3.7),
Vji = [Vj,V
P
i ] is the voltage vector. Once the interface voltage V
P
i is obtained
from previous iterations in subsystem i, it will be treated as a reference bus and
maintain a constant value until the computation of power flow (or reachable sets) in
subsystem j completes, i.e., Vj is obtained. The aforementioned inner loop iteration
is terminated when one of the following two criteria is satisfied:





where ∆Vjj is the voltage increments between iterations in subsystem j, εi is a given
threshold of the inner loop iteration, Li is the iteration number, and Iter
max
i is the
given upper limit of iteration number.
Note that, during the inner loop iterations in subsystem j, the power exchange
between subsystem j and subsystem i is updated correspondingly at each iteration
step due to the update of Vj in subsystem j. Thus, physical laws (e.g., Ohm’s law)
on the line linking two subsystems are fully respected for each time interval.
3.5.2.2 Data Exchange between Subsystems
Since both power flow calculation and reachable set computation in subsystems are
carried out based on interface information, data exchange between subsystems plays
an essential role in our DFA implementation. Taking into account different iterations
and calculation times which may be used in subsystems, we introduce a status ‘Flag’
to communicate the computation progress in each subsystem, as defined in (3.16):
Flag = [Subsystem-ID,Convergence, Results], (3.16)
where Subsystem-ID is the ID of the neighboring subsystem, Convergence is a binary
indicator of whether the subsystem is converged or not, where 1 means convergence
and 0 means not converged, Results are the final voltages at the interface after the
iteration in this subsystem stops. The use of ‘Flag’ is inspired by [60]; its update
can be implemented, for instance, through a software-defined technique as detailed
in [61].
The introduction of status flag concept has the following three advantages:
• Each subsystem always uses the latest converged results from its neighboring
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subsystems.
• It is a privacy-preserving design with only interface data transferred, which
means it helps ensure data security. In the future, we will use a data encryption
technique to ensure the integrity and confidentiality of the interface data, and
to protect against attacks such as monster-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks.
• Flag is programmable, which means features can be easily added or removed
based on needs.
The basic idea of data exchange is given in Fig. 3.3, with the following three steps
involved within one time step:
Subsystem 2
. . .
Data & Flag 1
Iterations
Data & Flag 2
Iterations
Iterations Iterations
Subsystem 3 Subsystem i
Subsystem 1
 
Fig. 3.3: Data exchange between subsystems.
• Each subsystem updates the information of its interface with other subsystems,
i.e., SIkk or S
I
jj in (3.10). Specifically, in distributed power flow calculation, they
are crisp-value-based data, whereas in subsystems’ reachable set calculation, it
is set-based data. Meanwhile, status flags are transmitted as well to confirm
the validity of the data.
• Once status flags correlated to one subsystem show all its interface data is
available, the inner loop power flow or reachable set calculation will be carried
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out. For example, subsystem 1 will not run its calculation until it receives
the interface data and status flags from subsytems 2, 3, and i, when they are
interconnected as shown in Fig. 3.3. Therefore, power flows or reachable sets will
be computed in parallel based on the data from last iterations in the neighboring
subsystem.
• After the iterations in the subsystems finish, the corresponding interface data
and status flags are broadcast to their neighbors in the outer loop for the next
iteration.
3.5.3 Impelentation of DQG
When the reachable sets are obtained, DQG can be used to efficiently evaluate the
stability of systems. Specifically, (2.16) and (2.17) will be used to estimate the eigen-
value distribution at the edge of the reachable set in each subsystem. After obtaining
Geršgorin disks in the ith subsystem, the real part of the approximated eigenvalue
located rightmost, αei,max, can be expressed as follows:
αei,max = max(skk + rk(Si,P)), (3.17)
where max(·) means the maximum value, skk and rk(Si,P) can be found in (2.16).
αei,max is then used to evaluate the stability of the i
th subsystem.
3.5.4 Stability Margin Evaluation
Based on the aforementioned reachable set calculation and Geršgorin disks computa-
tion, stability margin of an interconnected system under disturbances can be explored
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using the procedures given in the Chapter 2.5.2.
3.6 Test and Validation of DFA and DQG
A typical NM system shown in Fig. 2.3 is used to test and validate the presented
DQG-based DFA approach by analyzing what impact is imposed by DERs on system
dynamics. In order to better illustrate this impact, the NM system is operated in
islanded mode, which means the circuit breaker is open. More details of the test
system can be found in the Chapter 2.6.
3.6.1 Verification of N +M Decomposition
In order to better validate the effectiveness of the N+M decomposition, two different
partitions are presented.
3.6.1.1 Case I: Partitioning into Two Subsystems
The original NM system is partitioned into two active subsystems: N = 2 and M = 0
in (3.10). Specifically, the branch between node 6 and node 10 is broken down,
i.e., subsystem 1 comprises microgrids 1, 3, and 6, whereas subsystem 2 comprises
microgrids 2, 4, and 5. Based on the partitioning described above, subsystem 1
conducts its power flow calculation by using the power injection from node 10. At
the same time, subsystem 2 conducts power flow calculation by using the power
injection from node 6.
Fig. 3.4 shows the voltage magnitude comparison between the N +M decomposi-
tion method and the centralized calculation. Fig. 3.5 and Fig. 3.6 show the changes of
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variables during the Newton iterations in subsystem 1 and subsystem 2, respectively.
Fig. 3.7 demonstrates the differences of power injections on the interface between the
current iteration and the previous one. The stopping criteria of subsystem 1 and sub-
system 2 are set as εi = 1.0e−10, whereas that of their interface is set as εo = 1.0e−5.
In order to better illustrate the value changes during iterations, the L2 expression is
adopted with the following conversion [62]:
‖ri‖2 = −10/ln(‖vi‖2), (3.18)
where‖ri‖2 is the L2 value shown in figures at each point, and‖vi‖2 is the correspond-
ing L2 value of the real value during iterations.
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Fig. 3.5: Iterations of power flow calculation in the subsystem 1 in Case I.
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Decreasing Error














Fig. 3.6: Iterations of power flow calculation in the subsystem 2 in Case I.
Monotonic Decreasing
 
Fig. 3.7: Iterations on the interface of two subsystems.
From Figs. 3.4–3.7, it can be seen that:
• Result comparisons on Fig. 3.4 have verified the feasibility and effectiveness of
N +M decomposition in distributed power flow calculation.
• The calculation in each subsystem is a non-monotonic process. The reason is
that calculations in each subsystem are carried out based on the interface data
(SIkk and S
I
jj in (3.10) ) at the previous iteration step. However, after subsystems
exchange data, their incrementals involved in the Newton iteration may become
large again at the next iteration step (e.g., point B in Fig. 3.5) even though the
current step is converged (e.g., point A in Fig. 3.5).
• Sub-iterations in subsystems may be different from each other, which validates
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the necessity of status flags. For example, during iteration step 2, four sub-
iterations are needed before the calculation is converged in subsystem 1; how-
ever, only three sub-iterations are involved in subsystem 2.
• The iterations on the interface of subsystems are monotonically decreasing,
which means N + M decomposition is an effective method in distributedly
calculating the power flow of NMs.
3.6.1.2 Case II: Partitioning into Four Subsystems
In this test, the original NM system is decoupled into four subsystems to further vali-
date the N +M decomposition and compare it with the results in case I. Specifically,
the broken branches are 6 − 7, 6 − 10, 15 − 16. The other settings are the same as
those in case I. Fig. 3.8 shows the changes of variables during iterations in subsystem
1 which includes microgrid 1 and microgrid 6. Fig. 3.9 demonstrates the differences
in power injection on the interface between the current iteration and the previous
one.
Decreasing Error
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Fig. 3.8: Iterations of power flow calculation in the subsystem 1 in Case II.




Fig. 3.9: Iterations on the interface in Case II.
• The more subsystems there are, the less calculation time it may need to finish
one iteration in each subsystem. For instance, in Fig. 3.5, 0.05s is taken to
complete the four sub-iterations in the first iteration. Meanwhile, it only takes
0.03s to finish the four iterations in case II, which is only 60% of that in case I.
• From Figs. 3.5–3.9, it can be seen that the more subsystems there are, the more
iterations it may need to converge. For instance, it takes 10 iterations to finally
converge in case I, whereas it requires 15 iterations in case II. This intuitive
result is caused by the frequent data exchange between subsystems.
3.6.2 Reachable Set Calculation via DFA
In this test, case I is adopted. Meanwhile, multiple active power fluctuations are
introduced in microgrid 2, i.e., ±1%,±5%,±8%,±10% and ±12% around its baseline
power output.
3.6.2.1 Reachability Analysis
Fig. 3.10 shows the three dimensional reachable set along the time line with a cross















Fig. 3.10: 3-D reachable sets of Xpi, Xqi in Microgrid 3 of the subsystem 1.
of control variable of active power (Xpi), z-axis shows the value of control variable
of reactive power (Xqi). Fig. 3.11 and Fig. 3.12 show the cross sectional views of
reachable sets in microgrid 3 and microgrid 4, respectively. More details of Xpi and
Xqi can be found in the Chapter 2.6.
From Figs. 3.10–3.12, it can be seen that:
• DFA is able to calculate the operation boundaries of a NM system subject to
different uncertainty levels, which validates that the presented N + M decom-
position technique can be effectively combined with the reachability analysis.
• The zoomed-in plot in Fig. 3.10 shows that the size of reachable sets increase
as the uncertainty level increases. The correctness of the DFA result is further
verified by the comparison between DFA and the centralized formal analysis
(FA) via reachable set, which is not shown here due to the exact same results.
• Fluctuations in active power can also impact microgrids’ reactive power output








Fig. 3.11: Reachable sets of Xpi, Xqi in Microgrid 3 of the subsystem 1 projected to the
time line.
Table 3.1: Deviations Comparison between Active and Reactive Power
Uncertainties Deviations of Active Power Deviations of Reactive Power
±1% [−1.17%, 1.16%] [−2.73%, 2.84%]
±5% [−5.96%, 5.74%] [−12.57%, 15.39%]
±8% [−9.64%, 9.09%] [−18.93%, 26.18%]
±10% [−12.15%, 11.29%] [−22.72%, 34.09%]
±12% [−14.70%, 13.45%] [−26.18%, 42.65%]
feeders [22]. For instance, Table 3.1 summarizes the deviations of Xpi and Xqi
at 1.5s based on the results shown in Fig. 3.11.
• Since reachable sets enclose the bound of all system trajectories, different distur-
bances may lead to different reachable sets; and thus, it can be used to pinpoint
critical disturbances on stability. Furthermore, it can be adopted to estimate








Fig. 3.12: Reachable sets of Xpi, Xqi in Microgrid 4 of the subsystem 2 projected to the
time line.
3.6.2.2 Impacts of DERs on Interconnected Systems
To better illustrate how stability issues deteriorate and what impact is imposed by
DERs on the interconnected grid, more severe DER disturbances are introduced in
microgrid 2, i.e., ±20% and ±30% around its baseline active power output at 0.5s
and 1.0s, respectively. Fig. 3.13 shows the cross sectional views of reachable sets in
microgrid 3, from which it can be seen that:
• When more severe disturbances are considered in DERs, the size of cross-section
of the reachable sets (possible values of all system trajectories at a given point
in time) drastically increase or even system trajectories may diverge quickly
from its original operation point as shown in Fig. 3.13. This is consistent with
the engineering experience, that the stability of the interconnected system de-
teriorates with the integration of more DERs without a proper coordination.









More Uncertainties  
Fig. 3.13: Reachable sets of Xpi, Xqi in Microgrid 3 when more uncertainties are
introduced.
ther actions (e.g., adaptive control) can be conducted to enhance the stability
of interconnected systems.
Besides, the results in [34] also show how the stability performance deteriorates
when distributed generations are integrated into systems.
3.6.2.3 DFA Verification via Time Domain Simulation
Simulations in time domain are used to validate the coverage ability of DFA. For
clear and better illustration, seventeen simulation trajectories are selected to compare
against the DFA results. Fig. 3.14 and Fig. 3.15 show the simulation results of Xpi
and Xqi in subsystem 2. It can be observed that:
• The reachable sets are able to fully enclose the time domain trajectories, which





Fig. 3.14: Time domain simulation verification in Microgrid 4.
• The over-approximation of reachable sets in this test case is acceptable; however,
when the system size highly increases, techniques to reduce the conservative-
ness may become necessary, e.g., set splitting [37], optimality-based bounds
tightening [63].
The observations also show that DFA can obtain the same results as from the
centralized formal analysis shown in the Chapter 2.
3.6.2.4 Efficiency of DFA
The computation times among DFA, FA, and time domain simulations (TDS) are
given in Table 3.2, where ten calculations of TDS has been considered for comparison.
From Table 3.2, it can be seen that:






Fig. 3.15: Time domain simulation verification in Microgrid 5.
Table 3.2: Calculation Times for 1.5s Dynamics on a 3.4GHz PC
````````````Cases
Uncertainties ±1% ±5% ±8% ±10% ±12%
DFA (s) 7.5389 7.7167 7.7741 7.8023 8.4692
FA (s) 6.2591 7.5983 7.6089 7.6149 7.9167
TDS (s) 6.3284 6.3165 6.4726 6.4237 6.4827
• The results from one run of DFA calculation are able to enclose all possible
(infinitely many) system trajectories obtained via TDS, which means DFA is
always more efficient than deterministic TDS.
• DFA takes a little more calculation time than FA due to data exchange between
subsystems.
• Because the complexity of reachability analysis is O(n5) [34], DFA will outper-
form FA or TDS when the system scale n is large enough. It also justifies the









Fig. 3.16: Reachable set iterations.
3.6.2.5 Reachable Set Changes during Iterations
Fig. 3.16 shows the iteration process of the reachable set between Xpi and Xqi in
microgrid 3 at 0.2s and 1.0s, respectively. From Fig. 3.16, it can be seen that:
• Converged reachable sets in subsystems can be obtained after several iterations.
• Reachable sets can be calculated via parallel iterations, which enables the plug
and play of subsystems and makes the corresponding distributed stability anal-
ysis possible.
3.6.3 Stability Margin Analysis via DQG-based DFA
In this test, the feasibility of DQG-enabled DFA is demonstrated via calculating the
stability margins at different time points. Fig. 3.17 (a) shows the stability margin of
Microgrid 5 at 0.2s; whereas Fig. 3.17 (b), (c), and (d) illustrate the corresponding
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Geršgorin disks at different operation points, respectively. It can be seen that:
Geršgorin disks
Exact Eigenvalues
(b) Geršgorin disks at point A
(c) Geršgorin disks at point B (d) Geršgorin disks at point C





 Fig. 3.17: Stability margin of Microgrid 6 at 0.5s.
• The stability margin can be efficiently obtained, which validates the feasibility
of the DQG-enabled DFA.
• DQG is able to effectively assess the stability when the system operation point
is far away from its stability margin, e.g., the point A in Fig. 3.17 (a) and its
results in (b). Therefore, in this case, exact eigenvalue calculation is no longer
necessary.
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• As the uncertainty increases, Geršgorin disks are approaching the y-axis, e.g.,
the point B in Fig. 3.17 (a) and its results in (c).
• When the system is approaching its stability margin, results from DQG may be
conservative (e.g., the point C in Fig. 3.17 (a) and its results in (d)), and thus,
exact eigenvalue inspection becomes necessary.
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Chapter 4
Compositional Power Flow for
Networked Microgrids
4.1 Motivation and Challenges
NM is a new paradigm which unlocks the potentials of microgrids such as enabling
the power exchange among microgrids, the pooling of generating capacities in micro-
grid clusters for supporting critical loads, and even quickly blackstarting main grid
after major blackout. An indispensable function for planning and operation of inten-
tional island NMs and the computation of aforementioned FA and DFA is power flow
calculation which, however, remains an open challenge.
The major bottlenecks for NM power flow include: 1) an islanded microgrid no
longer has a swing bus; rather, both DERs and loads follow droop characteristics,
which has not been fully addressed by the state of the art methods [64]. 2) NMs
are designed to support plug-and-play of neighboring microgrids and achieve voltage
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restoration and power sharing through secondary control, which cannot be solved by
existing centralized power flow analysis methods [65]. Moreover, existing methods
require full access to individual microgrid data, while few microgrid owners would
permit disclosure of their privacy [52].
In order to address the aforementioned critical issues, to address the inherent dif-
ficulties in NM power flow, we contribute a novel compositional power flow (ComPF)
method which fully supports plug-and-play of microgrids, incorporates DER/load
droops within a microgrid, takes into account the voltage regulation and power shar-
ing for NMs, and protects data privacy via limited data exchange.
4.2 Compositional Power Flow
To tackle the NM power flow, we introduce a compositional scheme, originally in-
voked in the formal methods community [66], that provides network-level solutions
from power flow solutions of individual microgrids and their interconnections. Specif-
ically, ComPF is a framework that integrates an advanced-droop-control-based power
flow (ADPF) for islanded microgrids and adaptive-secondary-control-based power
flow (ASPF) for NMs, as shown in Fig. 4.1.
4.2.1 ADPF for Islanded Microgrids
When a microgrid operates in islanded mode and cannot fully cover its load, the
P/F-Q/V droop strategy is usually adopted in DERs and loads as shown in Fig. 4.2.
Assume in Microgrid i, DERs initially operate at point A, whereas the load demand
reaches point B. ADPF will then adjust both DER generation and load demand in
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Fig. 4.2: Schematics of ADPF and ASPF.
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each iteration according to (4.1) and (4.2), and eventually Microgrid i will reach an
equilibrium at point C.
∆Pi = (f




where mP,i and mQ,i are the droop coefficient vectors of P/F and Q/V; f
r and Vri
are the references of frequency and voltage vector; f and Vi are the actual values
of frequency and voltage vector in each iteration. Here f is a global variable, and
Vi is a local vector only available for local buses in Microgrid i without assuming a
communication network.
4.2.2 ASPF for NMs
On top of ADPF, ASPF accounts for coordination operations between microgrids.
Define the power exchanges between Microgrids i and j as the vector Si,j = Pi,j+jQi,j,
then the voltages of each microgrid can be updated as:
Vi = V
r
i −BCBVi ·BIBCi · {(Si + Si,j)/Vi}∗, (4.3)
where BCBVi and BIBCi are the Branch Current to Bus Voltage matrix and Bus
Injection to Branch Current matrix pertaining to Microgrid i [65], and Si is the load
vector of Microgrids i. Depending on NM’s operating strategy, Si,j may be updated
in any of the following ways:
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4.2.2.1 Voltage Control Mode
Here the objective is to regulate the voltages at leading DER bus in each microgrid
(see point B in Fig. 4.2). Our practical experiences show that, if power exchanges and
the leading DER voltage are treated independently, ComPF is hard to converge. To
resolve this issue, power exchange are associated with secondary control as follows:
Pi,j = P
p





i,j + βi ·Qbase,i · imag(V
r
DER,i −VDER,i), (4.5)
where Ppi,j and Q
p
i,j are the active and reactive power exchanges from the previous
iteration, Pbase,i and Qbase,i are the base values (usually set as the maximum power of
Microgrid i) that scale voltage changes making them comparable to power changes, αi
and βi are step sizes, V
r
DER,i and VDER,i are the reference values and actual values of
leading DER voltage, real(·) and imag(·) are functions to get the real and imaginary
parts. (4.4) and (4.5) are set based on the fact that active power is strongly correlated
to the real part of voltage whereas reactive power is correlated to the imaginary one.
4.2.2.2 Power Dispatch Mode
Here the objective is to control power exchanges across the interface when a microgrid
with power deficit is supported by its neighbors. Since the power exchanges among
microgrids can be determined by the voltages across their interfaces, it is equivalent to
control the voltages at the interface buses. Once the power exchange Si,j are scheduled
in the NM coordination layer (or an energy management system if it exists), (4.3)
can be used to solve power flow in each microgrid. Specifically, a DER bus is usually
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selected as the adaptive swing bus [65], and its voltage is updated based on the voltage
mismatches of the interface buses as follows:
Vi,s = V
r
i,s + {BCBVi ·BIBCi · {(Si + Si,j)/Vi}∗}k, (4.6)
where Vi,s and V
r
i,s are the voltages of the adaptive swing bus and its corresponding
reference value for Microgrid i, {BCBVi ·BIBCi · {(Si + Si,j)/Vi}∗}k is the voltage
deviation at the interface bus k. Then Vi,s will be used to update the voltage of other
buses in Microgrid i via (4.3).
Under the voltage update mechanism in (4.6), the interface bus voltages can be
controlled at the desired values to achieve the scheduled power exchanges.
The aforementioned ASPF results in an adaptive and secure architecture because:
• Both control modes can be implemented within one architecture, triggered by
different control demands.
• Only limited data, i.e., DER voltages and power exchanges in the voltage control
mode and power exchanges in the power dispatch mode, need to be sent to the
coordination layer to calculate the power exchanges.
4.2.3 ComPF Algorithm
The overall ComPF algorithm follows a triple loop process. The primary loop is to
solve the power flow problem based on the updated power of DERs and loads via
the secondary loop. The tertiary loop is to update the power exchanges through NM
interfaces. ComPF is described in Algorithm 1.
Currently, the direct backward/forward sweep [64] is embedded in Algorithm 1 in
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view of the fact that most microgrids operate with a tree structure. Nevertheless, the
principle of ComPF is generic because other techniques including modified Newton,
implicit Zbus Gauss, current injection, can be likewise adopted under this framework.
Algorithm 1: ComPF Algorithm




i , Vi, V
r
i , f , f
r
2: repeat
3: Update Pi,j, Qi,j Eq. (4.4/4.5) or given value
4: repeat
5: Update ∆Pi, ∆Qi Eq. (4.1/4.2)
6: repeat
7: Update Vi Eq. (4.3/4.6)
8: until Vi is constant
9: Update Vi, f
10: until Vi,s and f are constant
11: Update VDER,i
12: until VDER,i or Pi,j, Qi,j is constant
4.3 Test and Validation of Compositional Power
Flow
The effectiveness of ComPF is validated on a 69-bus NM system consisting of three
microgrids (see Fig. 4.3). We will evaluate ComPF in four cases. Case 1 verifies the
correctness of ADPF by operating three islanded but unconnected microgrids through
droop control only . Case 2 subsequently interconnects three microgrids by closing
the two tie switches and observes the NM behaviors during natural power exchanges.
Based on Case 2, Case 3 and Case 4 are constructed by increasing both active power
and reactive power of Load 61 in Microgrid 2 by 50%. Specifically, Case 3 verifies the
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Fig. 4.3: Test NM system (Base voltage: 12.66 kV, base power: 5000 kVA, see [67] for
detailed backbone parameters).
Table 4.1: DER/Load Adjustments and Droops Calculated with ADPF Results for
Microgrid 1 (Stopping tolerance: 1.0e− 6 p.u.)
Initial Values (kVA) ADPF Values (kVA) ∆f/∆Pi ∆Vi/∆Qi
DER1 150.00 + j150.00 184.21 + j166.70 0.9999 1.0000
DER29 60.00 + j10.00 82.81 + j21.21 1.4997 1.5005
Load28 26.00 + j18.60 22.58 + j16.93 10.0027 10.0185
Load45 39.22 + j26.30 35.80 + j23.92 10.0027 10.0076
Load46 39.22 + j26.30 35.80 + j23.92 10.0027 10.0084
ComPF under the power dispatch mode.
Case1: ADPF Calculation: The droop coefficients of DERs at buses {1, 29, 50,
61, 16, 27} are set as {1.0, 1.5, 0.8, 1.2, 1.0, 2.0}, respectively. The droop coefficients
of loads at buses {28, 45, 46, 49, 61, 64, 11, 12} are set to the same value 10.0.
Here the P/F and Q/V use the same droop coefficients. Under droop control, the
frequencies of the three microgrids are stabilized at 59.5895Hz, 59.6569Hz, 59.8111Hz,
respectively.
Case2: Free Interconnection of Microgrids : This case emulates the microgrid syn-
chronization process where the three microgrids are interconnected after the microgrid
frequencies and interface bus voltages are regulated to nominal values.























































Fig. 4.5: Voltage magnitude in Microgrid 3.
DER power outputs to maintain the DER terminal voltages at 1.01 p.u., meanwhile
covering the loads. The stopping tolerance for each microgrid is set as 1.0e− 6 p.u.,
whereas that for their interfaces is set as 1.0e− 3 p.u..
Case4: Networking Microgrids in Power Dispatch Mode: The objective here is to
adjust DER power outputs to actively dispatch power among microgrids. Specifically,
DER outputs in Microgrid 2 are capped at the same level as in Case2 as the DERs
reach their capacity limits, whereas Microgrids 1 and 3 provide the agreed power
exports (in this case equally shared) to offset the load change in Microgrid 2.
Note that, to better illustrate the convergence process, the voltage differences
between non-swing buses and the adaptive swing bus in Microgrid i, ri, is scaled up
by ‖ ci ‖2= −10/ln(‖ ri ‖2), where ‖ · ‖2 is the L2-norm.
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Fig. 4.6: Active power outputs of DERs.
A few insights can be obtained by observing the test results:
• The droop coefficients inversely calculated from the ADPF results (see Ta-
ble 4.1) are identical to the preset droop values, which proves the correctness
of ADPF.
• Case3 indicates that, for NMs operating in the voltage control mode, all DER
voltages are controlled as pre-scheduled. However, as shown in Figs. 4.4 and 4.5,
the voltage profile of Microgrid 2 is inferior to that in Case2 due to the excessive
load and the lack of scheduled power assistance from neighboring microgrdis.
• Case4 shows that power exchanges are correctly dispatched between microgrids
to fix the power deficit in Microgrid 2, which verifies the efficacy of ComPF.
DER outputs in different cases are compared in Figs. 4.6 and 4.7.
• The iterations for Case3 including those at the microgrid interfaces and within
microgrids are illustrated in Fig. 4.8, showing a satisfactory convergence per-
formance.
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Fig. 4.8: Convergence process in Case3.
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Chapter 5
Non-Detection Zone Analytics for
Unintentional Islanding in
Distribution Grid Integrated with
Distributed Energy Resources
5.1 Motivation and Challenges
Beyond the intentional islanding study in Chapter 4, unintentional islanding hazard is
another concern for utility companies. Power distribution grids in the U.S. are being
impacted by the increasingly deep integration of DERs [68, 69]. For instance, as of
2016, there were 1.7 gigawatts of grid-tied DERs within Eversource Energy’s service
territory (Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire), including over 12,000
residential solar photovoltaic (PV) projects installed in Connecticut and over 4,600
additional projects in progress, as shown in Fig. 5.1. This number is projected to be
quadrupled within the next four years. Nationwide, a new PV was interconnected to
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the distribution grids every two minutes in 2015, a speed that is likely to increase in the
future due to the significant drop in PV costs. Consequently, a major challenge that
utility companies face is the possibility of unintentional islanding of a feeder, which
can create safety hazards for utility customers and field crews [70]. Unintentional
islanding is of particular concern when larger DERs are connected to a feeder, as
such configurations may mimic normal grid conditions, causing the PV inverters’ anti-
islanding algorithms to be deceived into staying online and creating an unintentional
island. This challenge rapidly escalates with the trend of more frequent storm-induced
blackouts where DER units may continue to energize a power line from customers’
homes or businesses.
To mitigate the detrimental impact without knowing the possibility of uninten-
tional islanding, utility companies face prohibitively costly upgrades to install a new
protection and communication infrastructure such as transfer trip facilities [71]. Fur-
thermore, those expensive ‘fit and forget’ solutions can hardly accommodate the fast
changes in DERs’ plug-in, loads, and distribution grids. Another utility concern is
that the UL 1741 unintentional islanding test is conducted on a single inverter at a
time and does not address inverter or generation diversity on the distribution sys-
tem. Therefore, it is unclear whether a deeper integration of DERs would increase
the possibility that unintentional island might not be detected or decrease? Thus, a
pressing question to be addressed for distribution planning and operations is how to
reliably assess unintentional islanding hazards of an arbitrary feeder in cases of high
penetration scenarios.
Non-detection zone (NDZ) refers to the regions in an appropriately defined space
where islanding detection schemes fail to detect the abnormal islanding mode [72–76].
Therefore, NDZ can serve as a practical metric for assessing the hazard of uninten-
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Fig. 5.1: DERs installed across Eversource service territory in Connecticut as of 2016
tional islanding. NDZ is often a by-product of anti-islanding methods which can
be found in a plethora of literature falling into two main categories: active detec-
tion and passive detection. Active approaches, e.g., slip-mode frequency shift [77],
active frequency drift [78], Sandia frequency shift [79], voltage shift [80], high fre-
quency signal injection [81], positive-feed-back-based method [82], d-axis disturbance
signal injection [83], and reactive power disturbance [84], have fast responses while
causing perturbations in the distribution systems. Passive approaches, e.g., Bayesian
passive method [85], rate of change of frequency [86], over/under frequency [86],
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over/under voltage [86], fuzzy method [87], pattern recognition [88], and phase jump
detection [89], do not disturb the system while generating a more conservative NDZ
than active methods. Examining NDZ under the deep integration of DERs in large
distribution grids, however, remains an open challenge.
Motivated by the challenges detailed above, a learning-based, DER-driven non-
detection zone (D2NDZ) evaluation method is devised to effectively quantify the NDZs
in distribution networks with the deep integration of DERs. Our main contributions
are three-fold:
• D2NDZ incorporates both the steady-state and dynamic impacts of different
types of DER units. Particularly, a series of formulas are derived to compute
the contribution of the dynamic characteristics of various DERs to NDZ, making
the D2NDZ results extremely close to those obtained from detailed simulation-
based methods.
• D2NDZ establishes an optimization-based learning scheme that estimates NDZs
for any grids quickly and effectively without precise electromagnetic transients
simulations, which offers an ultra-fast means of evaluating a system’s islanding
possibilities.
• A D2NDZ software tool has been developed and successfully implemented for
operational planning in Eversource Energy, the largest power utility company
in the Northeast.
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5.2 Analytical Method of DER-Driven Non-Detection
Zone
Mathematically, the boundary of NDZ is a hull made up of critical operating points.
Based on the research results in [74], the generation to load ratio (G/L) and the power
factor are good candidates that can be selected to form a two-dimensional NDZ. For
a distribution feeder with a deep integration of DERs (see Fig. 5.2 [74]), its NDZ is
determined by the total effect of both steady state and dynamic behaviors of loads
and DERs after the feeder is disconnected from the main grid [90]. Therefore, one
can construct a baseline NDZ, that is determined by the steady state of the feeder
and then augment it by incorporating the dynamic impacts of DERs. This forms the



























































where PDER andQDER are the active and reactive power injection from DER units; PG
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Fig. 5.2: A schematic distribution feeder showing aggregated load and DER
5.2.1 Derivation of Baseline Non-Detection Zone
5.2.1.1 G/L Bounds
Islanding detection normally takes only a few cycles, whereas DER units such as PV
array and wind turbine generators usually operate at maximum power points that
do not change instantaneously. This means that DER power outputs can be treated
as constants when the steady-state is analyzed [84]. Therefore, the active power
consumption along the feeder before and after islanding (circuit breaker S tripped off
and switched on) can be expressed by (5.3) and (5.4), respectively [74].





(V + ∆V )2
R + ∆R
, (5.4)
where ∆V is the voltage deviation after islanding, ∆R is the resistance change after
islanding, the expanded form of ∆R can be found in Appendix B. As a result, the















Based on Appendix B, ∆R
R







(2µ+ µ2)PIPC + µPIPP
PIPC + PIPP + PPPC
, (5.6)
where µ = ∆V/V is the voltage deviation, PI , PP , PC are the percentages of constant
impedance, constant power and constant current loads, respectively. Substituting






(1 + µ)2(PIPC + PIPP + PPPC)
(1 + µ)2PIPC + (1 + µ)PIPP + PPPC
= f(µ, PI , PP , PC). (5.7)
Consequently, by considering the voltage deviation bounds within which an island






















= max f(µ, PI , PP , PC), (5.9)
where µ means voltage deviations under different islanding durations.
5.2.1.2 Power Factor Bounds
The reactive power consumed in the feeder load before and after islanding can be
formulated in (5.10) and (5.11), respectively.
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where ∆f is the frequency deviation, ∆L and ∆C are impedance changes after is-















By defining the quality factor Qf =
R
2πfL













where ρ = ∆f/f is the frequency deviation. Note that, (5.14) and (5.15) have
been substituted in (5.12) to derive (5.13). (5.14) and (5.15) are justified because the
variations in load inductance and capacitance are small before and after islanding [74].





According to the relationship of the load resonant frequency before and after
























= g(µ, ρ,Qf ). (5.17)
Consequently, by considering the voltage and frequency deviation bounds within
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= max g(µ, ρ,Qf ), (5.19)
where ρ means frequency deviations under different islanding durations.
5.2.2 Non-Detection Zone Bounds Driven by DER Dynamics
Besides the steady-state behaviors, the transient processes of the DER units also
significantly impact NDZ, especially on its boundary. In order to incorporate this
effect, detailed DER models are built at the beginning [22,91]; and scenarios in vari-
ous distribution feeders are then tested via electromagnetic transient (EMT) simula-
tions to provide experimental data; finally, these experimental data are analyzed and
learned to develop a generic formulation which is used to augment the baseline NDZ.
Considering the deep integration of PVs, small hydro units (induction generator or
synchronous generator), and battery storages in Eversource Energy, these types of
DER units are analyzed in detail. Other types of DERs can be models in the D2NDZ
study following the same procedure.
5.2.2.1 Impact of DER Dynamics on G/L Bounds
Our experimental results obtained from EMT simulations show that the impact of
DER dynamics on NDZ bounds is strongly related to the number of the connected
DERs, i.e., the more power electronics interfaced non-dispatchable DERs (e.g., PV)
a system has, the more compact its NDZ will be. This seemingly counter-intuitive
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phenomenon can be explained as follows: The control systems of DERs must be prop-
erly coordinated to enable a seamless transition from the grid-connected mode to the
islanded mode [22]. In practice, it is very difficult to achieve this goal when multiple
DERs are integrated at different locations without communication, exponentially re-
ducing the size of NDZ. Therefore, exponential models are established to reflect the
impact of DER dynamics on NDZ bounds. The following exponential model is given
as an example to characterize the impact of PV dynamics on G/L bounds.
φPV,L = βPV,L(1− αPV,Le−NPV ), (5.20)
φPV,H = βPV,H(1− αPV,He−NPV ), (5.21)
where e(·) means the exponential function; NPV is the number of PV units; coefficients
βPV,L, αPV,L, βPV,H , αPV,H can be determined by learning the experimental data. Note
that, after data learning, βPV,L and βPV,H should be updated by multiplying a coef-
ficient to ensure a conservative NDZ estimation. Likewise, the impacts of induction
generators, synchronous generators, battery storage, or any other type of DER can
be respectively modeled as follows:
φInd,L = βInd,L(1− αInd,Le−NInd), (5.22)
φInd,H = βInd,H(1− αInd,He−NInd), (5.23)
φSyn,L = βSyn,L(1− αSyn,Le−NSyn), (5.24)
φSyn,H = βSyn,H(1− αSyn,He−NSyn), (5.25)
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φBat,L = βBat,L(1− αBat,Le−NBat), (5.26)
φBat,H = βBat,H(1− αBat,He−NBat), (5.27)
where NInd, NSyn, and NBat are the numbers of induction generators, synchronous
generators and batteries, respectively, φInd,L and φInd,H characterize the impact of
induction generators’ dynamics on G/L bounds, φSyn,L and φSyn,H characterize the
impact of synchronous generators’ dynamics on G/L bounds, φBat,L and φBat,H char-
acterize the impact of battery storage’s dynamics on G/L bounds.
Subsequently, the overall impact of DER dynamics on the lower and upper bounds
of G/L (G/L being the first dimension of NDZ) can be expressed as a weighted sum of
individual contributions from different types of DERs. For instance, if PV, induction
generator, synchronous generator and battery storage are considered, the overall effect










= −δPV φPV,H + δIndφInd,H + δSynφSyn,H + δBatφBat,H , (5.29)
where δPV , δInd, δSyn, δBat are Kronecker signs.
5.2.2.2 Impact of DER Dynamics on Power Factor Bounds
Similar to the analysis above, the overall impact of DER dynamics on the lower and
upper bounds of the power factor, which represents the second dimension of NDZ,












= −δPV ϕPV,H + δIndϕInd,H + δSynϕSyn,H + δBatϕBat,H , (5.31)
where the contributing factors are given by:
ϕPV,L = γPV,L(1− ηPV,Le−NPV ), (5.32)
ϕPV,H = γPV,H(1− ηPV,He−NPV ), (5.33)
ϕInd,L = γInd,L(1− ηInd,Le−NInd), (5.34)
ϕInd,H = γInd,H(1− ηInd,He−NInd), (5.35)
ϕSyn,L = γSyn,L(1− ηSyn,Le−NSyn), (5.36)
ϕSyn,H = γSyn,H(1− ηSyn,He−NSyn), (5.37)
ϕBat,L = γBat,L(1− ηBat,Le−NBat), (5.38)
ϕBat,H = γBat,H(1− ηBat,He−NBat), (5.39)
where ϕPV,L and ϕPV,H characterize the impact of PV’s dynamics on power factor
bounds, ϕInd,L and ϕInd,H characterize the impact of induction generators’ dynamics
on power factor bounds, ϕSyn,L and ϕSyn,H characterize the impact of synchronous
generators’ dynamics on power factor bounds, ϕBat,L and ϕBat,H characterize the
impact of battery storage’s dynamics on power factor bounds.
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5.3 Parameter Optimization in DER-Driven Non-
Detection Zone
As an estimation method, the performance of D2NDZ mainly depends on the param-
eters in each formula, e.g., αPV,L, αPV,H , etc. In this paper, an optimization-based
learning approach is developed to determine these parameters from the experiments’
data. This will guarantee that the formulas learned will produce NDZs as close as
possible to those provided by electromagnet transients simulations that are often
prohibitively expensive in practice. A salient feature of this parameter determination
method is its capability to adapt to new information, which means it can use online
or offline learning to update parameters, making D2NDZ more accurate over a longer
period of time.
The parameter determination of D2NDZ are formulated into four independent
optimization problems in that the parameters for identifying any of the four bounds
of NDZ are independent of those for the other bounds. For instance, (5.40) shows
the optimization formulation for learning the parameters that determine the lower











is the estimated lower bound of G/L from D2NDZ, and X denotes the set
of the parameters to be determined, i.e., βPV,L, αPV,L, βInd,L, αInd,L, βSyn,L, αSyn,L,
βBat,L, and αBat,L. Note that the experimental data can be classified into different
groups if necessary [92]. One D2NDZ can be established in each group to estimate


















s.t. X ∈ Rn.
(5.40)
92
where NS is the number of experimental scenarios. In (5.40), NS ( 1) experimental
scenarios are generated on the test systems to improve the robustness of D2NDZ.
The weight coefficient mi of a scenario should be increased if the probability of the
ith operation scenario increases [22].
5.4 Implementation of D2NDZ
The procedures of D2NDZ, including NDZ estimation and unintentional islanding


















Fig. 5.3: Flowchart of D2NDZ computations
In Fig. 5.3, D2NDZ Formulas are initially established based on Experiment Data
Study and Analysis. Parameters involved in these formulas are then determined
through optimization methods. Then D2NDZ Calculation will be carried out based
on the Evaluation Standard and the actual Operation Information of a system, e.g.,
numbers of DER units, power load, etc. Meanwhile, the unintentional islanding haz-
ards can be assessed and reported by using the system’s actual Operation Information.
Note that experiment data which needs special arrangement and time for prepara-
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tion is essential to the parameter learning process of D2NDZ. Further studies can be
performed to improve the parameter learning process if necessary [92,93].
A software tool with an easy-to-use Excel interface has been developed and de-
ployed in Eversource Energy for the planning and operation of DER interconnections.
In the future, experiment database and system operation information can be updated
online which will enable D2NDZ to serve as a real-time tool for running unintentional
islanding analytics.
5.5 Test and Validation of D2NDZ
A distribution feeder in Eversource Energy which consists of 3717 sections, three PV
arrays, and one induction generator based hydro power station is used to validate
D2NDZ. Since the topology of an actual distribution grid is very complex, reasonable
system reduction is necessary to accelerate system modeling, simulation and evalua-
tion. Fig. 5.4 shows schematic one-line diagram of the equivalent feeder, with more
details given in Appendix IV. The high-fidelity of the reduced model in re-producing
system dynamics and steady state behaviors has been thoroughly validated [94], which
is omitted due to limited space. Note that the D2NDZ approach is also potentially
applied to a distribution feeder with the mesh topology.
5.5.1 Learning Parameters
As the flowchart in Fig. 5.3 demonstrates, it is fundamentally important to generate
experiment data for D2NDZ to learn coefficients. Based on IEEE Standard 1547 [95],






























































Fig. 5.4: A typical distribution feeder in Eversource Energy
the islanding situation can last for at least 1s with voltage and frequency in acceptable
ranges; 2s means the islanding situation can last for at least 2s; and 3s means the
islanding situation will last for more than 3s, which is the most dangerous case for
utilities, because both voltage and frequency are within normal operation ranges in
these scenarios; and thus, unintentional islanding cannot be detected.
Base of logarithm function
 
Fig. 5.5: Objective function value during the parameter optimization process
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Table 5.1: Typical Ranges Adopted by Eversource Energy
Durations µmin µmax ρmin ρmax
>1s −0.5000 0.2000 −0.0083 0.0667
>2s −0.5000 0.1000 −0.0083 0.0333
>3s −0.1200 0.1000 −0.0083 0.00085
Table 5.2: Optimization Results for D2NDZ Coefficients
Durations αPV,L αPV,H αInd,L αInd,H αSyn,L αSyn,H
>1s 0.4803 0.3215 1.4127 1.9704 1.8803 1.8128
>2s 0.3601 0.4125 1.6402 2.4150 2.0549 1.7842
>3s 1.0802 0.3549 1.5921 2.0543 1.8845 1.8123
Durations ηPV,L ηPV,H ηInd,L ηInd,H ηSyn,L ηSyn,H
>1s 0.1583 0.2060 0.2596 0.1368 0.2037 0.1905
>2s 0.1548 0.0195 0.0861 0.1345 0.1950 0.2306
>3s 0.1105 0.0201 0.1008 0.1435 0.1503 0.1809
Durations αBat,L αBat,H ηBat,L ηBat,H
>1s 1.8028 1.6813 0.2810 0.1692
>2s 1.8835 1.7421 0.1460 0.1816
>3s 1.8320 1.6902 0.1205 0.1712
Note that the NDZ corresponding to each islanding duration is formulated as four
optimization problems, as shown in (5.40). Fig. 5.5 depicts the change in the objective
function in optimizing (5.40) to determine X, which validates the effectiveness of the
parameters learning in D2NDZ. For a better illustration, logarithm values are adopted
for the y axis, with the objective value at iteration 2 being selected as the base of
the logarithm function. Table 5.1 summarizes the typical modified ranges correlated
to IEEE Standard 1547, which are adopted by Eversource Energy in practice, and
Table 5.2 shows the D2NDZ coefficients obtained from parameters optimization.
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5.5.2 Verification of NDZ Analytics
5.5.2.1 Comparisons between D2NDZ and Simulation-based method
Comparisons of NDZs constructed by D2NDZ and EMT simulations are shown in
Fig. 5.6, where two cases are given as examples. In Case 1, only PV1 is integrated
in the test feeder, whereas all three PV arrays are interconnected in Case 2. In both
cases, the load percentages are set as: PI = 0, PP = 50%, PC = 50%. In each
case, the errors in the four NDZ bounds for three different islanding durations are
calculated via the following assessment indices, as summarized in Table 5.2. The





























Fig. 5.6 offers the following insights:
• NDZs obtained from D2NDZ closely approach those from the EMT simulations
within acceptable errors, meaning D2NDZ is effective;
• Through the learned formulas, D2NDZ can quickly estimate NDZs for any given
feeder [94] without numerous and time consuming EMT simulations, meaning
D2NDZ is efficient ;
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(b) 2s NDZ Comparison in case 1
(c) 3s NDZ Comparison in case 1
(d) 1s NDZ Comparison in case 2
(e) 2s NDZ Comparison in case 2
(f) 3s NDZ Comparison in case 2
































































Fig. 5.6: Comparisons between D2NDZ and simulation-based method
• An NDZ constructed by D2NDZ always over-approximates the irregular NDZ
obtained from point by point EMT simulations, meaning D2NDZ is dependable.
This feature, in fact, is extremely important and helpful in practice, since it
gives an early warning to utility engineers in advance when a feeder’s operating
point is approaching NDZ.
The EMT simulation results in two cases are also compared in Fig. 5.7 to verify
that the more power electronics interfaced non-dispatchable DERs a system has, the
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Table 5.3: Errors of Four NDZ Boundaries in Each Case
XXXXXXXXXXErrors
Cases Case 1 Case 2
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
exmin 0.78% 2.05% 0.99% 1.54% 1.64% 3.09%
exmax 1.91% 0.03% 0.48% 0.51% 0.16% 2.70%
eymin 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.006
eymax 0.05 0.11 0.04 0.01 0.006 0.003
1s NDZ in Case 1
1s NDZ in Case 2
2s NDZ in Case 1
2s NDZ in Case 2
3s  NDZ in Case 1



















































Fig. 5.7: Comparisons of NDZ in two cases
more compact the NDZ will be.
5.5.2.2 Impacts of DER Units on NDZ
The progressively deeper integration of DERs, especially power electronics interfaced
units (e.g., PV and battery), is significantly changing distribution grids’ transient
performance. Therefore, it is critically important to explore the impact of different
DER units on NDZ. Fig. 5.8 shows the D2NDZ results for six different cases where
the only difference is the combination of DERs while the feeder configuration and
loading conditions remain the same. The load percentages in each case are set as
PI = 0, PP = 50%, PC = 50%. The following can be observed:
• Impact of Conventional Generators on D2NDZ Boundary : The interconnection
of induction (or synchronous) generators are able to enlarge the boundary of
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(a) Impacts of PV on NDZ (b) Impacts of induction generator on NDZ 
(c) Impacts of synchronous generator on NDZ (d) Impacts of battery on NDZ 
(e) Impacts of combination of PV and 
induction generator on NDZ 
(f) Impacts of combination of PV and 
battery on NDZ  
Fig. 5.8: Impacts of DER units on NDZ
NDZ, as shown in Fig. 5.8 (b) and (c).
The reason is that both induction and synchronous generators are rotating ma-
chines providing considerable inertia. In addition, some generators are equipped
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with exciter and governor controllers which enable them to ride-through tran-
sient processes. With these machines, it is likely a distribution feeder can survive
as an island with acceptable voltages and frequency for a few seconds or longer,
creating much larger NDZs for 1s, 2s, and 3s.
• Impact of Power Electronics on Baseline NDZ : Power electronics interfaces
decrease the baseline boundaries of NDZ, which is obtained when only the
steady-state is considered (using (5.7) and (5.17)). For instance, the baseline
NDZ for the case ‘3s NDZ of one PV’ in Fig. 5.8 (a) is [77.44%, 121%] for G/L
and [−0.0502, 0.0506] for the power factor, which is significantly larger than the
overall NDZ obtained by D2NDZ.
The reason is that low-inertia power electronic interfaces make the distribution
feeder so sensitive to disturbances that their dramatic transient process can
easily violate the volt/frequency requirements specified in IEEE Standard 1547
and thus can hardly sustain an island.
• Impact of Power Electronics on D2NDZ Boundary : Under deep DER integra-
tion, e.g., when G/L is around 100%, the more power-electronics-interfaced
DER units a distribution feeder has, the smaller its NDZ would be, as shown
in Fig. 5.8(a) and Fig. 5.8(b).
The reason is that the D2NDZ boundary is largely related to the DER transient
process which is mainly determined by DER controllers. It is basically infeasi-
ble to coordinately design their control parameters so as to seamlessly switch a
feeder to operate in islanded mode.
• Impact of Battery on D2NDZ Boundary : The NDZ of a feeder integrated with
an inverter interfaced battery is larger than that of a feeder integrated with
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PV, but smaller than that of induction or synchronous generators, as shown in
Fig. 5.8 (d).
Although power-electronics-interface leads to a relatively smaller NDZ, as an
energy storage device is usually controlled by a droop strategy [22], a grid-
connected battery system can adjust its real and reactive power outputs and
thus respond to the grid disturbances. Consequently, battery storage helps
stabilize an isolated distribution feeder and results in a relatively larger NDZ
than PV does.
• Impact of PV on D2NDZ Boundary : Fig. 5.8 (e) and (f) show that the emer-
gence of MPPT controlled PV [22] in a system brings about a smaller NDZ
than the case when the system only has an induction generator or battery.
Adding low-inertial DERs in the generation mix, therefore, decreases the NDZ
boundaries.
5.5.2.3 Impacts of Loads on NDZ
NDZ results are also impacted by the percentages of a load mix, especially the baseline
NDZ as shown in (5.7). Taking G/L as an example, it can be seen in Fig. 5.9 how
the upper and lower bounds of the baseline G/L vary with the load percentages.
Fig. 5.9 offers the following insights:
• Different load compositions significantly change the lower and upper bounds
of NDZ, indicating loads play an important role in forming an unintentional
island.
• When PI = 0, the lower bound of the baseline G/L reaches its minimum (25%);
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Fig. 5.9: Impacts of loads on baseline NDZ
Therefore, if a system has no constant impedance load, its baseline NDZ be-
comes very large. When PI = 63.01%, PP = 0.99% and PC = 36.00%, the
lower bound of baseline G/L reaches its maximum (93.32%); meanwhile, the
corresponding upper bound is 100.91%. When PI = 57.01%, PP = 0.99%,
PC = 42.00%, the upper bound of the baseline G/L reaches its minimum
(100.89%); meanwhile, the lower bound of G/L is 93.22%. Therefore, when
a system has around a 60% constant impedance load and almost zero constant
power load, its NDZ becomes very small.
5.5.3 Unintentional Islanding Frequencies
Once NDZs are obtained from D2NDZ, the unintentional islanding hazards of the
test feeder can be approximately assessed by estimating the frequencies at which the
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operating points fall into the NDZs when the feeder is tripped off. The frequencies
assessment for Case 1 in the above Subsection B (see Fig. 5.6) is illustrated in Fig. 5.10,






Fig. 5.10: Unintentional islanding frequencies assessment
First we count the number of operating points (green dots in Fig. 5.10) that enter
the NDZs and divide it by the total number of operating points over a specific time
interval (normally one year). This probability multiplied by the probability of feeder
tripping incidents gives the unintentional islanding probability. Fig. 5.10 shows the
conditional probability that operating points falling into 1s, 2s, 3s NDZs are 5.67%,
5.35%, and 2.44%, respectively. If the probability of feeder tripping is 0.01, the
unintentional islanding probabilities would be 0.0567%(≥ 1s), 0.0535%(≥ 2s), and
0.0244%(≥ 3s). Note that D2NDZ can also estimate NDZs considering the ride-
through requirements based on the latest IEEE 1547 Standards. Such results are
not included due to the limited space. Once the unintentional islanding frequencies
are identified, further studies can be carried out either to reduce or even eliminate
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these frequencies, or to enable a stable system operation within NDZ, e.g., inter-
active control [96], proactive management [97], or adaptive optimization-based load
shedding [98].
In summary, D2NDZ can produce results as close as those from EMT simulations,
which enables fast offline or online assessment of the unintentional islanding of an
arbitrary feeder. Before D2NDZ was adopted by Eversourse Energy, it took an engi-
neer up to a few months to build an NDZ for a specific feeder because this requires
creating thousands of testing scenarios. With our D2NDZ tool, it only takes a few







6.1 Motivation and Challenges
Communication network is essential in the aforementioned distributed calculation
(DFA, DQG, ComPF), and thus, cybersecurity of communication network is an in-
dispensable concern. Communication infrastructure and inverter controllers in DERs
are two essential constituents in operating a stable and secure NM system. Nowa-
days, Software-Defined Networking (SDN) [99,100] has been increasingly employed to
enable ultra-fast microgrid control, support scalable NMs, and respond to NM con-
tingencies [61]. Although the global monitoring and real-time configuration of SDN
significantly enhance the resiliency and reliability of NMs [101], it makes the system
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vulnerable to cyberattacks due to its holistic network visibility and flexible network
programmability [102, 103]. Those attacks are typical cases of the first generation of
cyberattacks on the power grids as they exploit information technology (IT) networks
such as SDN to compromise NM operations. Recently there is an emergence of a
second generation of cyberattacks on the power grids, i.e., the use of power bots which
are corrupted power-consuming or DER devices controlled by remote attackers. Con-
sequently, cybersecurity concerns have become a major hurdle to the wide adoption
of NMs.
In recent years, awareness of attacks against SDN has grown in the computer
science community. VeriFlow introduces a layer between control plane and data
plane to detect the network anomalies [104]. Based on the model checker techniques,
FlowChecker is a tool to identify intra-switch misconfiguration in one single encoded
FlowTable [105]. AvantGuard introduces connection migration and actuating triggers
to deter data-to-control-plane saturation attacks [106]. FRESCO provides OpenFlow-
enabled detection and mitigation modules [107]. ANCHOR attempts to enforce global
policies for security in SDN [108]. DELTA provides a security assessment framework
which can perform SDN attacks in diverse test environments [109]. Despite the above
advances, the inherent vulnerability inside OpenFlow controllers remains an open
challenge. Because the hosts for data communication in SDN network are the key to
secure resilient operations of microgrids and NMs [102, 103], cyberattacks on these
hosts are the foremost challenges yet to be addressed. Power bot attacks on the DER
inverter controllers exacerbate the cybersecurity risks in NMs because NM operations
fully depend on the reliable functioning of the DER inverters. Nevertheless, existing
fault-tolerant control and robust control are designed to detect and accommodate
traditional faults and thus can neither identify nor mitigate power bot attacks [69].
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To bridge the gap, a Software-Defined Active Synchronous Detection (SDASD)
method is proposed to effectively defend against both the first generation of cyberat-
tacks such as cyberattacks on SDN network and the second generation of cyberattacks
such as power bot attack on inverters. First, a dynamic defense strategy is devised
and implemented in the SDN communication infrastructure to protect NMs against
cyberattacks on SDN network. Meanwhile, by using a probe signal transmitted via a
secured SDN network, active synchronous detection will be developed to detect power
bot attacks on inverter controllers of DERs. The novelties of SDASD are threefold:
• It offers extremely lightweight real-time detection of cyberattacks on cyber-
physical NMs, meaning it would not compromise the performance of SDN net-
work or DER controllers. Thus, secure ultra-fast controls can be guaranteed to
significantly improve the stable operation of NMs.
• It enables active detection of power bot attacks quickly and precisely by inject-
ing programmable probe signals into NMs. Therefore, once an NM system is
under attack, security issues can be quickly pinpointed and restorations can be
efficiently implemented.
• It enables a secure plug-and-play function of microgrids via OpenFlow protocol.
It means in the future, NMs can be configured and dispatched more effectively.
6.2 Architecture of Software-Defined Active Syn-
chronous Detection
SDASD is a generic framework that includes two layers: (1) Network security layer
for protecting the data plane communication channel of SDN network, and (2) power
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Fig. 6.1: SDASD architecture.
bot defense layer for actively detecting attacks on DER controllers in physical NMs
based on the probe signals transmitted via the secured SDN network. Fig. 6.1 shows
the architecture of SDASD.
In Fig. 6.1, the function of Networked Microgrids Coordination Center (NMCC)
is to coordinate the operations of NMs and generate probe signals used for the power
bot defense layer. SDN Controller is based on protocols, such as OpenFlow [110], and
enables intelligent networking in the communication network. In Microgrid, the DC
output of each DER is converted by an Inverter to AC output, and then integrated
into the physical NMs through an Interface circuit [22,111]. The Control System is to
adjust the power output from a DER unit. Specifically, the Phase Lock Loop (PLL) is
adopted to identify the phase of input signals, usually the three-phase voltages [112].
This phase is then used either in Primary Controller or Secondary/Tetiary Controller
to generate a droop-control signal or secondary/tetiary control signal for the double-
109
Cyberattack?





No traffic to compromised hosts
SDN 
Network
Generate small probe signals NMCC
Yes Yes
DER inverter controllers in NMs





Power bot attack?Normal 
operation
 
Fig. 6.2: Defense steps of cyberattack and power bot attacks.
loop controller [113], i.e., Outer Loop and Inner Loop. Attack Detection usually uses
a detection function to identify attacks. One typical example of the double-loop
controller and attack detection is given in the Chapter 6.4. Filter is used to eliminate
any possible noise introduced by the probe signal. Finally, the signals generated by
the double-loop controller are transformed from the dq frame to the abc frame, and
the PWM technique [114] is then used to generate signals to control the switches,
such as IGBTs, in the Inverter.
Strategies of detection and defense of cyberattack and power bot attacks on the
aforementioned cyber-physcial NMs are summarized in Fig. 6.2 and further introduced
in the following sections.
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6.3 Defense Against Cyberattacks on SDN
This paper focuses on defending the hijacking attacks of hosts (for data communi-
cation) of networked microgrids coordination center (NMCC) and microgrids, be-
cause poisoning data via hosts could easily and significantly deteriorate the normal
operation of a NM system. The essential idea of defending such cyberattacks on
SDN data plane is to set up a HostStatus Checker flag in Host Tracking Service
(HTS) [115, 116] in SDN controller to check the precondition and postcondition of
hosts so as to authenticate their entity.
6.3.1 Host Tracking Service Update in SDN Controller
In NMs or other cloud computing scenarios, host or controller might migrate fre-
quently due to physical topology changes of microgrids. Since the host profile is
maintained and used in the SDN controller to track the location of one specific host
within network, the HTS provides an effective way to track network mobility. Specif-
ically, HTS monitors the HostStatus Checker flag in the Packet-In messages,
and once is aware that a particular host migrates to a new location, HTS updates
host profile table where each item includes host MAC address, switch port number,
and switch Datapath ID (DPID) [102].
6.3.2 Defending Strategies
The defending strategies are shown in Fig. 6.3, including the following perspectives:
• Precondition: Before a host of NMCC or microgrid migrates to another location,















Fig. 6.3: Cyberattack defending strategies.
HostStatus Checker. At this moment, the host is supposed to be unreachable
in the previous location.
• Postcondition: After the host successfully migrates to the new location, a Port-
Up message will be sent to the SDN controller from the new location to com-
plete the update of HostStatus Checker and host profile table. At this mo-
ment, the host is supposed to be available in the new location.
• Defense against cyberattacks:
– Malicious Data Injection: If data packets are received with the same host
information (MAC/IP address) but from different locations (import infor-
mation) without sending a Port-Down message to the SDN controller
beforehand, it means the location migration did not happen actually. This
event will be identified as a host location hijacking cyberattack, and the
following actions will be taken: (1) alarms will be raised; and (2) the
corresponding malicious traffic from the new location will be blocked to
guarantee normal operation of NMs.
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– NMs Critical Data Sniffer: If data packets are received from a new host
only sending Port-Up message to SDN controller beforehand but without
Port-Down message, this host will be identified as a compromised host,
and the following steps will be taken: (1) SDN controller will immediately
shut down its corresponding port; and (2) normal traffic will not be sent
to the compromised host.
6.4 Active Synchronous Detection in DER Con-
trollers of NMs
In this paper, active synchronous detection [69] is extended to detect power bot
attacks in NMs and is implemented through SDN network. The essential idea of
active synchronous detection includes the following three steps:
(1) NMCC generates small probe signals;
(2) Those signals are transmitted via the secured SDN network to targets (e.g. DER
controllers);
(3) The target responses are transmitted back to NMCC and compared against pre-
determined detection rules to identify whether and where power bot attacks occur.
6.4.1 Probe Signals for Active Synchronous Detection
To ensure the real-time detection and non-impediment of the targets’ normal oper-
ations, the probe signals being continuous, periodic, and with small magnitudes in
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frequency domain are preferable. Mathematically, those features can be described as:
s(t) = s(t+ nT), (6.1)
∥∥s(f)∥∥ ≤ ε, (6.2)∫ t+T
t
s(t)dt = 0, (6.3)
where T is the period of the continuous signal s(t),‖·‖ is the l2 norm of the harmonic
at the frequency f , ε is a small threshold. (6.1)-(6.3) offer the following features:
• The impact of the probe signal on the target within one period is zero, which
means the probe signal does not change the overall performance of DER con-
trollers.
• The probe signal is programmable and can be modified flexibly at the NMCC,
if necessary, to further increase the cost of the adversary.
6.4.2 Active Synchronous Detection in DER Controllers
The most malicious power bot attacks on NMs could be those on the inverter con-
trollers of DERs because such attacks can immediately compromise or collapse NMs.
As the dq double loop controller is widely used in DER inverters [22] (see Fig. 6.1),
active synchronous detection of power bot attacks on this type of controllers is devel-
oped to exemplify how the detection rules are built.
The cyber-secured double loop structure is illustrated in Fig. 6.4, where probe
signals, e.g., sd(t) and sq(t), are generated in NMCC and then delivered through the
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Fig. 6.4: Active synchronous detection on double loop controller.
be adjusted whenever necessary. The attack detection function can be chosen as a






s(t) · c(t)dt, (6.4)
where s(t) refers to probe signals sd(t) or sq(t); c(t) corresponds to control signals
Idref , Iqref , Vdref , or Vqref ; D represents the attack detector signals including the outer
loop signals (Ddo and Dqo) and the inner loop signals (Ddi and Dqi). These detector
signals are calculated in NMCC and discussed below.
6.4.3 Detection Rules
Detection rules are derived and built in the NMCC to identify the type and location of
a power bot attack. Two typical power bot attacks on DER controllers are considered:
(1) Topologies of controllers are attacked and modified;
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(2) Parameters in DER controllers are overwritten by attacker.
To detect the attacks, two sinusoidal signals in (6.5) and (6.6) are generated at
the NMCC and routed to the DER controller.
sd(t) = αd sin(ωdt), (6.5)
sq(t) = αq sin(ωqt). (6.6)















































In brief, (6.7) and (6.8) show the outer loop responses of the detection function
given in (6.4) in the d -axis and q-axis, respectively; and similarly, (6.9) and (6.10)
show the inner loop responses in the d -axis and q-axis, respectively. More details of
the above derivation can be found in Appendix B.
So, by using (6.7) and (6.8), attacks on the outer loop of DER controller can
be identified; attacks on the inner loop can be detected via (6.9) and (6.10). More
specially, if a DER controller is intact, the steady-state values of the detector signals
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Table 6.1: Values of Detector Signals in the d -axis under Power Bot Attacks
Controller
Under Attack





























































Table 6.2: Values of Detector Signals in the q-axis under Power Bot Attacks
Controller
Under Attack





























































should be identical to the values given in (6.7)-(6.10). Otherwise, if the DER controller
is under attack, the detector signals will deviate from these values. Table 6.1 and
Table 6.2 summarize the abnormal values under the aforementioned attacks. By
checking these abnormal values, the type and location of a specific power bot attack
can be identified.
6.5 Test and Validation of Software-Defined Ac-
tive Synchronous Detection
A typical NM system shown in Fig. 6.5 is used to test and validate the effectiveness
of SDASD in defending against cyber-physical attacks on NMs. This test system
includes six microgrids and operates in islanded mode, which means Circuit Breaker
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0 is open. More details of the test system can be found in Appendix B. Fig. 6.6 shows
the SDN topology used for the NM system, including one SDN OpenFlow controller
Ryu [117] and five switches. The NM system is modeled in Matlab/Simulink. Simu-
lation time step is 50µs, and a sample rate of 10 for communication data is selected.
SDN network is running in a Mininet environment. In Mininet, we set the band-
width for each link as 1Gbps, following a common practice used in Ethernet network.
User Datagram Protocol (UDP) [118] is adopted to transmit data packets between
microgrids and NMCC through Mininet [119].
6.5.1 Verification of SDASD on Defending Against Cyberat-
tacks
NMCC is initially running in Center 1 whose IP address is 10.0.0.7. Center 2 with
IP address 10.0.0.8 is a new migrated destination. To verify the efficacy of SDASD
in defending against cyberattacks, three different cases are given as follows:
6.5.1.1 Case1: Cyberattacks without SDASD
Center 2 is hacked and keeps injecting fake packets in the name of Center 1 with
same MAC/IP address. Here we use Scapy [120] to periodically generate those fake
packets. Specifically, to manipulate the NM system, at t = 2.0s attacker injects
malicious packets with the payload of 10 into the probe signal sd(t) of Battery 25. It is
originally a sinusoidal wave with amplitude αd = 0.01 and frequency ωd = 1256rad/s.
When abnormal value of Ddo is detected, Circuit Breaker 3 is opened at t = 2.05s.
Fig. 6.7 shows the data traffic, where before t = 2.0s, packets are only sent from
Center 1, and after t = 2.0s, malicious traffic are added from Center 2. Fig. 6.8 shows
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Fig. 6.6: The topology of SDN network corresponding to the NM system in Fig. 6.5.




















Fig. 6.7: Case1: Traffic monitoring (packet received by Battery 25).
the probe signal received by Battery 25. It can be seen that without SDASD, the
malicious traffic significantly affects the normal traffic and more malicious data are
received by Battery 25. Fig. 6.9 shows the voltage and current responses in Microgrid
3, which indicates cyberattacks severely impact NM normal operations and eventually
lead to a system collapse.
 
(a) Profile of Sd(t) (b) Zoom-in of Sd(t) before 2.0s (c) Zoom-in of Sd(t) around 2.0s  
Fig. 6.8: Case1: Probe signal sd(t) of Battery 25 under cyberattacks.
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(a) Voltage response under cyberattack without SDASD 
(b) Current response under cyberattack without SDASD 
 
Fig. 6.9: Case1: Voltage and current responses at bus 25.
6.5.1.2 Case 2: Cyberattacks Elimination with SDASD
The same cyberattack is launched and in this case SDASD will detect the anomaly
in Center 2 and protect the SDN network to guarantee data security. With SDASD,
traffic from malicious host will be forwarded to the SDN controller through Packet-
In message and, since there is no Port-Down message, no flow rules will be added;
finally these data packets will be directly discarded. Fig. 6.10 shows alarm is raised
in SDN network. Fig. 6.11 shows the normal operation of NMs with SDASD.
From Figs. 6.8∼6.11, it can be seen that:
• Without SDASD, malicious packets can be easily injected into SDN network via
compromised host, because from SDN controller’s viewpoint, data packets are
sent out from the same location even though part of the data are actually from
the malicious Center 2 as shown in Fig. 6.7. Therefore, without SDASD, SDN
network is vulnerable to host location hijacking cyberattacks. Such attacks will
further cause catastrophic collapse in NMs as shown in Fig. 6.9.
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• With SDASD, the NM system is prevented from malicious hijacking attacks.
SDASD is able to guarantee reliable operations of NMs under network attacks
and avoid possible economic losses of customers.
Fig. 6.10: Case 2: Alarm is raised in SDN network
(a) Voltage response under cyberattack with SDASD 
(b) Current response under cyberattack with SDASD 
 
Fig. 6.11: Case 2: Voltage and current responses at bus 25.
6.5.1.3 Case 3: Normal NMCC Migration under SDASD
In this test, we demonstrate a scenario of normal NMCC migration. In this case,
NMCC moves from Center 1 to Center 2 at t = 2.0s. Port-Down message is sent
to the SDN controller to pre-update the host profile table, and traffic from Center 1
will stop immediately. When Center 2 is effective, a Port-Up message is forwarded
















Fig. 6.12: Case 3: Divert traffic during normal migration process with SDASD.
SDN controller will update the flow rules in the switch by installing new rule and
removing old rule. Finally, the probe signals will be sent from Center 2 to Battery
25. In this process, the NM system is able to maintain normal operation similar
to Fig. 6.11. Fig. 6.12 shows the divert traffic during the migration process. From
Fig. 6.12, it can be seen that:
• Before t = 2.0s, the probe signals are sent from Center 1; while after t = 2.0s,
they are sent from Center 2 instead. This means NMCC successfully migrates
to a new location.
• SDASD is able to guarantee highly reliable host location migration, which is very
important for resilient NMs operations due to the frequent topology changes in
NMs caused by microgrid islanding and re-connecting.
6.5.2 Validation of Active Synchronous Detection of Power
Bot Attacks on DER Controllers
As SDASD is capable of guaranteeing the cybersecurity of the SDN network, it is
reasonable to assume the probe signals and detection signals are transferred via a se-
cured SDN network. To fully justify the effectiveness of active synchronous detection
on power bots, four different cases are given as follows:
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(b) Voltage response of bus 25
(a) Voltage response of bus 18
 
Fig. 6.13: Case 4: Voltage response of buses 18 and 25 without SDASD.
6.5.2.1 Case 4: Type I Attack Validation
A type I attack is launched on the inverter inner loop of Battery 18 in Microgrid 2
at t = 1.10s. Two sub-cases are introduced to compare the performance of the test
system without or with SDASD. When SDASD is activated, αd = αq = 0.01 and
ωd = ωq = 1256rad/s. Fig. 6.13 shows the three-phase voltage responses at buses 18
and 25 before SDASD is applied. Fig. 6.14 and Fig. 6.15 illustrate the three-phase
voltage and current responses under SDASD protection. Fig. 6.16 demonstrates the
changes ofDdo in Battery 18. Specifically, the power bot attack is detected via SDASD
at t = 1.108s when Ddo reaches zero, and Circuit Breaker 2 is opened immediately to
disconnect Microgrid 2 to isolate the attack.
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Type I attack starts on Battery 18
Microgrid 2 is disconnected

































(a) Voltage response of bus 18 with SDASD
(B) Current response of bus 18 with SDASD
 
Fig. 6.14: Case 4: Voltage and current response of bus 18 with SDASD.
6.5.2.2 Case 5: Type II Attack Validation
A type II attack occurs on the inverter inner loop of Fuel Cell 27 in Microgrid 4
at t = 1.20s, where Kdi is modified from 0.25 to 10.0. Fig. 6.17 shows the three-
phase voltage responses at buses 27 and 31 when SDASD is disabled. Fig. 6.18 and
Fig. 6.19 illustrate the three-phase voltage and current responses after SDASD is
applied. Specifically, SDASD detects the attack at t = 1.217s and Circuit Breaker 4
is opened immediately to disconnect Microgrid 4 to isolate the attack. Figs. 6.13∼6.19
show that:
• Without SDASD, the impact of attack rapidly spread across the interconnected
NMs and significantly deteriorate its performance (see Fig. 6.17).
• With SDASD, the power bot attack is detected and isolated to mitigate its
impact on the overall NM system as shown in Fig. 6.15 and Fig. 6.19, which
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Type I attack starts on Battery 18
Microgrid 2 is disconnected
(a) Voltage response of bus 25 with SDASD
(b) Current response of bus 25 with SDASD
 
Fig. 6.15: Case 4: Voltage and current response of bus 25 with SDASD.
validates the effectiveness of SDASD in detecting power bot attacks.
• The actual value of Ddo before the system attacked is 0.3498 (see Fig. 6.16)
which is proximate to the calculated value 0.35 obtained from (6.7). It verifies
the correctness of the detection rules.
• The value of Ddo changes to zero in Fig. 6.16 after Microgrid 2 is disconnected
from the NMs system. Seemingly it conflicts with the value shown in Tables 6.1
and 6.2 I after Microgrid 2 is disconnected from the networked system. The
reason is that Battery 18 operates abnormally due to attack, whereas Tables 6.1
and 6.2 only summarize the steady-state of detection results. In practice, alarm
should always be raised once the detection results change significantly, especially
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continuous abnormal operation
 
Fig. 6.16: Case 4: Detection results of Ddo in Battery 18.
(a) Current response of bus 27 without SDASD
(b) Current response of bus 31 without SDASD
 
Fig. 6.17: Case 5: Current response of buses 27 and 31 without SDASD.
6.5.2.3 Case 6: Simultaneous Attacks at Different Points
A type I attack occurs on the inner loop of Battery 31 at t = 2.10s; simultaneously, a
type II attack occurs on the inner loop of PV 35, where Kdi is modified from 0.25 to
20.0. Fig. 6.20 illustrates the three-phase voltage responses without and with SDASD.
From Fig. 6.20, it can be seen that SDASD can quickly detect attacks and isolate the
compromised system, which validates the feasibility of SDASD on protecting NMs
from simultaneous attacks at different points.
127
Type II attack starts on Fuel Cell 27
Microgrid 4 is disconnected
(a) Voltage response of bus 27 with SDASD
(b) Current response of bus 27 with SDASD
 
Fig. 6.18: Case 5: Voltage and current response of the bus 27 with SDASD.
6.5.2.4 Case 7: Validation of SDASD’s Reliability and Robustness
SDASD is expected to be both reliable and robust, which means (1) it does not
malfunction under various normal operation conditions; (2) it guarantees correct
detection with arbitrarily switched probe signals; and (3) it does not impede NM
operations. To demonstrate its reliability and robustness, microgrid operation con-
trol signals (e.g. Udref in Fig. 6.4) and probe signals s(t) are adjusted online through
NMCC. Specifically, the voltage magnitude reference signal of Battery 34 in Microgrid
6 is adjusted from 0.99 p.u. to 0.90 p.u. (i.e., from 323.33V to 293.94V ) at t = 1.30s,
and further adjusted to 0.95 p.u. (i.e., 310.27V ) at t = 1.42s. The amplitude of the
probe signal sd(t) is adjusted from 0.01 to 0.04 at t = 1.40s, and further adjusted to
0.02 at t = 1.50s. Fig. 6.21 shows the three-phase voltage and current responses with
SDASD, and Fig. 6.22 illustrates the changes of Ddo in Battery 34.
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Type II attack starts on Fuel Cell 27
Microgrid 4 is disconnected
(a) Voltage response of bus 31 with SDASD
(b) Current response of bus 31 with SDASD
 
Fig. 6.19: Case 5: Voltage and current response of the bus 31 with SDASD.
From Figs. 6.21∼ 6.22, it can be observed that:
• DERs can be effectively dispatched corresponding to the changes of control
signals. Such changes have no effect on the detection results, as illustrated in the
test results during [1.30s, 1.40s]. Therefore, SDASD can accurately distinguish
normal control operations from cyberattacks. It verifies SDASD is a reliable
solution for protecting NMs.
• As seen from Fig. 6.22, when the amplitude of the probe signal quadruples from
0.01 to 0.04 at t = 1.40s, the detection result will change from 0.3511 to 5.6205
which is 16 times of 0.3511. And when the amplitude of the probe signal halves
from 0.04 to 0.02 at t = 1.50s, the detection result will change from 5.6205 to
1.4179 which is 25% of 5.6205. The detection results thus are coincident with
the detection rules derived in Tables 6.1 and 6.2.
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(a) Voltage response of bus 25 without SDASD
(b) Voltage response of bus 25 with SDASD  
Fig. 6.20: Case 6: Voltage response of the bus 25 under simultaneous attacks.
• When the probe signal is adjusted online, the NMs system maintains its normal
operations as shown at t = 1.40s and t = 1.50s in Fig. 6.21. It indicates SDASD
is dependable and has zero footprint on a secured system.
Overall, SDASD is a ‘non-infrastructure’ solution because it neither modifies the










(a) Voltage response of bus 34 with SDASD
(b) Current response of bus 34 with SDASD
 
Fig. 6.21: Case 7: Voltage and current response of the bus 34 with SDASD.
Microgrid 2 is 
disconnected













 Fig. 6.22: Case 7: Detection results of Ddo in Battery 34.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
This dissertation contributes several innovative methods to deeply understand NM
stability, highly improve NM resiliency, and effectively defend against cyberattacks
on NMs. FA method is established to enable efficient stability analysis and stability
margins determination of NMs in the presence of heterogeneous uncertainties due to
high penetration level of renewable generation. DFA method is then devised based
on FA to efficiently investigate the stability of large-scale interconnected power grids.
After that, ComPF algorithm is presented to calculate NM power flow when a swing
bus does not exist in intentional islanding, which can be served as a fundamental func-
tion in FA and DFA. And D2NDZ is then developed to efficiently get the possibility
of unintentional islanding of an arbitrary distribution feeder integrated with DERs.
Finally, SDASD is well designed to detect and defend against cyberattack and power
bot attacks on NMs. The presented novel methods are able to increase situational
awareness and thus unlock the potential of networked microgrids as primary resilience
resources. Test results demonstrate their efficiency and effectiveness.
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In the future, FA and DFA will be applicable for not only forecasting and mon-
itoring grid performance, but also formally verifying various resiliency enhancement
strategies such as new schemes for system integrity protection and automation to
facilitate the extensive employment of DERs. Moreover, they can be further evalu-
ated on a real time simulation testbed and integrated in the advanced distribution
management systems (ADMS) to provide situational awareness and forecast operation
margin and stability margin of NMs. As a powerful tool for NM planning, design, and
operation, ComPF can be potentially explored using the zonotope technique adopted
in FA and DFA. It will provide a means to investigate how critical DERs impact NM
fundamental power flow calculation. By using machine learning technology, D2NDZ
can be further developed to enable real-time unintentional islanding evaluation, and
used as a practical, powerful, and efficient tool for planning, operating and protecting
in distribution networks. As the essential function in communication network, more
types of cyber-physical attacks on NMs and corresponding defense strategies can be
studied and integrated into SDASD to detect and defend against NM attacks.
The presented and future work will form the basis for NM infrastructure harden-
ing and optimized NM operation. They provide a set of system engineering tools to
minimize customer outages and the impact on critical infrastructures during extreme
weather events, cyberattacks and other threats. The new technologies are also appli-
cable for resiliency monitoring and management of other lifeline infrastructures such
as transportation, telecommunication, gas, and water distribution networks.
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Appendix A
Microgrid Equivalent Circuit used
in FA and DFA
The power-electronic-dominant microgrids equivalent model used in Fig. 2.3 is shown











































Fig. A.1: Power-electronic-dominant microgrid equivalent model.
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Table A.1: Parameters for Inverter Controllers in Microgrids shown in Fig. 2.3
Microgrids
Parameters
Tf Tr KP TP KQ TQ
2 0.01 0.01 0.45 0.02 0.45 0.02
3 0.01 0.01 0.80 0.01 0.80 0.01
4 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.02 0.50 0.02
5 0.01 0.01 0.30 0.02 0.30 0.02
6 0.01 0.01 0.40 0.02 0.40 0.02
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Appendix B
Math Derivations and Test
System’s Details in D2NDZ
B.1 Load Analysis after Islanding
Assume the load resistances before and after islanding can be expressed as follows.
R = RI +RP +RC , (B.1)
R + ∆R = (RI + ∆RI) + (RP + ∆RP ) + (RC + ∆RC), (B.2)
where RI , RP , RC represent the real part of constant impedance, constant power and
constant current loads before islanding, respectively; ∆RI , ∆RP , ∆RC represent the
incremental resistive portions in constant impedance, power and current loads after
islanding.
Given the percentages of constant impedance load, constant power load and con-
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stant current load, PI , PP , PC the fractions between the corresponding resistances
can be expressed as
RI : RP : RC = PPPC : PIPC : PIPP . (B.3)














Then ∆RP and ∆RC can be expressed as follows:
∆RP = (2µ+ µ









B.2 Derivation of the Power Factor
In order to obtain (5.13), (5.14) and (5.15) are substituted in (5.12). Detailed deriva-
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When ∆L ·∆C ≈ 0 and 1 + ∆L
L
≈ 1, (5.13) can be obtained from (B.8).
B.3 Frequency Analysis after Islanding







2π(L+ ∆L)(C + ∆C)
. (B.10)
Thus the frequency deviation ρ can be given as follows.
ρ =





(L+ ∆L)(C + ∆C)
− 1. (B.11)
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Table B.1: Power Loads at Each Node in Fig. 5.4
Node Pn (kW) Qn (kVAR) Node Pn (kW) Qn (kVAR)
4 8.3 4.6 5 207.6 112.5
47 963.1 517.9 48 897.3 477.0
51 100.6 53.6 53 153.0 81.0
62 100.2 53.5 54 382.1 203.2
56 68.1 37.8 57 93.1 51.0
58 280.0 153.9 6 513.4 276.6
68 3.1 2.0 66 2.3 1.6
8 678.2 165.3 9 342.1 182.4
10 19.6 10.3 11 334.1 178.3
14 954.5 517.3 15 155.3 83.2
64 1.5 2.3 80 4.9 2.4
16 155.3 83.2 86 208.7 112.7
17 375.0 199.2 19 149.9 82.0
21 692.5 381.7 22 49.1 26.8
83 4.9 3.6 91 5.2 2.1
27 571.7 311.3 28 5.3 2.9
29 684.3 369.0 32 238.7 127.0
34 607.1 334.1 69 93.0 50.2
72 270.1 144.8 37 141.4 76.0
43 4.6 2.3 46 3.4 2.1
B.4 Details of the Distribution Feeder in D2NDZ
The power load at each node in Fig. 5.4 are summarized in Table B.1, where Pn and
Qn are the total active power and reactive power at each node. The line impedances
between nodes in Fig. 5.4 are given in Table B.2.
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Table B.2: Line Impedances between Nodes in Fig. 5.4
From To R(Ω) X(Ω) From To R(Ω) X(Ω)
1 2 0.001 0.001 2 3 0.004 0.014
3 4 0.008 0.031 4 5 0.048 0.177
5 44 0.005 0.011 67 68 0.005 0.011
44 45 0.002 0.005 45 46 0.002 0.005
46 47 0.147 0.337 47 48 0.415 0.558
65 66 0.005 0.012 48 49 0.004 0.006
49 50 0.004 0.006 50 51 0.070 0.094
51 52 0.013 0.017 52 53 0.278 0.373
53 59 0.012 0.002 59 60 0.055 0.011
60 61 0.002 0.002 61 62 0.001 0.001
62 63 0.001 0.001 63 64 0.001 0.001
53 54 0.286 0.385 54 55 0.014 0.018
55 56 0.095 0.219 56 57 0.004 0.010
57 58 0.293 0.671 5 6 0.033 0.120
6 7 0.003 0.013 7 8 0.012 0.043
8 9 0.060 0.138 9 10 0.020 0.046
10 11 0.061 0.140 11 12 0.003 0.007
12 13 0.003 0.007 13 14 0.285 0.654
79 80 0.006 0.014 14 15 0.165 0.381
15 16 0.168 0.384 16 81 0.006 0.013
82 83 0.005 0.013 81 84 0.003 0.007
84 85 0.003 0.006 85 86 0.355 0.815
86 87 0.003 0.006 87 88 0.003 0.006
88 89 0.030 0.006 16 17 0.171 0.393
17 18 0.007 0.016 18 19 0.296 0.582
19 20 0.002 0.004 20 21 0.049 0.113
21 22 0.046 0.171 21 92 0.007 0.009
92 95 0.007 0.009 95 96 0.007 0.009
92 93 0.003 0.004 93 94 0.003 0.004
22 23 0.003 0.013 23 24 0.002 0.006
24 25 0.002 0.006 97 98 0.004 0.015
25 26 0.002 0.006 26 27 0.163 0.603
27 28 0.016 0.057 28 29 0.239 0.883
29 30 0.002 0.006 30 31 0.002 0.006
77 78 0.003 0.012 31 32 0.056 0.129
32 33 0.006 0.015 33 34 0.309 0.709
34 69 0.024 0.054 73 74 0.005 0.013
69 70 0.003 0.006 70 71 0.014 0.007
71 72 3.650 1.917 34 35 0.036 0.082
35 36 0.171 0.090 36 37 0.634 0.591
37 38 0.043 0.016 75 76 0.003 0.004
38 39 0.043 0.017 39 40 0.569 0.219
40 41 0.029 0.011 41 42 0.006 0.018
42 43 0.002 0.003
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Appendix C
Math Derivations and NM Details
in SDASD
C.1 Derivations of Detection Rules
According to (6.4), when s(t) refers to the probe signals sd(t), and c(t) corresponds






sd(t) · Idrefdt. (C.1)
Since Fig. 6.4 shows that Idref can be further expressed as:
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Table C.1: Line Impedances between Nodes in Fig. 6.5
Subsystems From To R(Ω/km) L(H/km) Length (m)
Microgrid 1
3 4 0.2840 0.2202e− 3 35
3 13 0.2840 0.2202e− 3 35
4 14 3.6900 0.2493e− 3 30
14 15 3.6900 0.2493e− 3 30
15 16 3.6900 0.2493e− 3 30
Microgrid 2
17 18 1.3800 0.2175e− 3 30
18 19 1.3800 0.2175e− 3 30
19 20 1.3800 0.2175e− 3 30
Microgrid 3
21 22 0.4970 0.2281e− 3 30
22 23 0.4970 0.2281e− 3 30
23 24 0.4970 0.2281e− 3 30
24 25 0.8220 0.2042e− 3 30
Microgrid 4
26 27 0.8710 0.2149e− 3 30
27 28 0.8710 0.2149e− 3 30
28 29 0.8710 0.2149e− 3 30
Microgrid 5 30 31 3.6900 0.2493e− 3 30
Microgrid 6
32 33 1.3800 0.2175e− 3 30
33 34 1.3800 0.2175e− 3 30
34 35 1.3800 0.2175e− 3 30
Backbone
5 6 0.2840 0.2202e− 3 35
7 8 0.2840 0.2202e− 3 35
8 9 0.2840 0.2202e− 3 35
9 10 0.2840 0.2202e− 3 35
10 11 0.2840 0.2202e− 3 35
11 12 0.2840 0.2202e− 3 35
C.2 Details of the NM system in SDASD
The line impedances of each microgrid in Fig. 6.5 are given in Table C.1. And the
power load and DER generation at each node are summarized in Table C.2 and
Table C.3, respectively.
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Table C.2: Power Loads at Each Bus in Fig. 6.5
Bus Pn (kW) Qn (kVAR) Bus Pn (kW) Qn (kVAR)
4 42.75 26.34 25 61.15 37.90
14 61.15 37.90 28 72.75 46.34
17 42.75 26.34 31 62.75 57.91
23 61.15 37.90 33 40.00 24.77
Table C.3: DER Generation at Each Bus in Fig. 6.5
Bus Pn (kW) Qn (kVAR) Bus Pn (kW) Qn (kVAR)
13 98.15 64.02 27 39.70 0.00
16 7.31 0.02 29 30.00 0.76
18 17.45 25.76 31 69.40 30.50
20 39.68 0.00 34 1.65 148.48
25 124.98 30.64 35 22.43 0.50
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tection using high-frequency signal injection,” IEEE Transactions on Industry
Applications, vol. 48, no. 5, pp. 1588–1597, 2012.
[82] X. Wang, W. Freitas, V. Dinavahi, and W. Xu, “Investigation of positive feed-
back anti-islanding control for multiple inverter-based distributed generators,”
IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 785–795, 2009.
[83] F.-J. Lin, Y.-S. Huang, K.-H. Tan, and J.-H. e. a. Chiu, “Active islanding detec-
tion method using d-axis disturbance signal injection with intelligent control,”
IET Generation, Transmission & Distribution, vol. 7, no. 5, pp. 537–550, 2013.
[84] X. Chen and Y. Li, “An islanding detection algorithm for inverter-based dis-
tributed generation based on reactive power control,” IEEE Transactions on
Power Electronics, vol. 29, no. 9, pp. 4672–4683, 2014.
[85] W. K. Najy, H. Zeineldin, A. H. K. Alaboudy, and W. L. Woon, “A bayesian
passive islanding detection method for inverter-based distributed generation
using esprit,” IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, vol. 26, no. 4, pp. 2687–
2696, 2011.
156
[86] F. De Mango, M. Liserre, and A. Dell’Aquila, “Overview of anti-islanding algo-
rithms for pv systems. part ii: Activemethods,” in Power Electronics and Mo-
tion Control Conference, 2006. EPE-PEMC 2006. 12th International. IEEE,
2006, pp. 1884–1889.
[87] S. Samantaray, K. El-Arroudi, G. Joos, and I. Kamwa, “A fuzzy rule-based
approach for islanding detection in distributed generation,” IEEE Transactions
on Power Delivery, vol. 25, no. 3, pp. 1427–1433, 2010.
[88] N. Lidula and A. Rajapakse, “A pattern recognition approach for detecting
power islands using transient signals—part i: Design and implementation,”
IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, vol. 25, no. 4, pp. 3070–3077, 2010.
[89] G.-K. Hung, C.-C. Chang, and C.-L. Chen, “Automatic phase-shift method for
islanding detection of grid-connected photovoltaic inverters,” IEEE Transac-
tions on Energy Conversion, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 169–173, 2003.
[90] Y. Li, P. Zhang, W. Li, J. Debs, D. Ferrante, D. Kane, S. Woolard,
R. Kalbfleisch, and K. Bowes, “A generic method for the determination of
non-detection zones in der-dominated distribution grids,” in Power and Energy
Society General Meeting, 2018 IEEE. IEEE, 2018, pp. 1–5.
[91] Y. Li, P. Zhang, and P. B. Luh, “Formal analysis of networked microgrids
dynamics,” IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 2017.
[92] Y. Low, J. E. Gonzalez, A. Kyrola, D. Bickson, C. E. Guestrin, and J. Heller-
stein, “Graphlab: A new framework for parallel machine learning,” arXiv
preprint arXiv:1408.2041, 2014.
157
[93] E. R. Sparks, A. Talwalkar, D. Haas, M. J. Franklin, M. I. Jordan, and
T. Kraska, “Automating model search for large scale machine learning,” in
Proceedings of the Sixth ACM Symposium on Cloud Computing. ACM, 2015,
pp. 368–380.
[94] Y. Li and P. Zhang, “Unintentional islanding analysis for eversource energy
feeders,” Technical Report submitted to Eversource Energy, 2017.
[95] “Interconnecting distributed resources with electric power systems,” IEEE Stan-
dard 1547-2003, Standard, 2003.
[96] Y. Zhang, L. Xie, and Q. Ding, “Interactive control of coupled microgrids for
guaranteed system-wide small signal stability,” IEEE Transactions on Smart
Grid, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 1088–1096, 2016.
[97] A. Gholami, T. Shekari, and S. Grijalva, “Proactive management of microgrids
for resiliency enhancement: An adaptive robust approach,” IEEE Transactions
on Sustainable Energy, 2017.
[98] A. Gholami, T. Shekari, and A. Sun, “An adaptive optimization-based load
shedding scheme in microgrids,” in Proceedings of the 51st Hawaii International
Conference on System Sciences, 2018.
[99] D. Kreutz, F. M. Ramos, P. E. Verissimo, C. E. Rothenberg, S. Azodolmolky,
and S. Uhlig, “Software-defined networking: A comprehensive survey,” Proceed-
ings of the IEEE, vol. 103, no. 1, pp. 14–76, 2015.
158
[100] L. Ren, Y. Qin, B. Wang, P. Zhang, P. B. Luh, and R. Jin, “Enabling resilient
microgrid through programmable network,” IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid,
vol. 8, no. 6, pp. 2826–2836, 2017.
[101] M. Dabbagh, B. Hamdaoui, M. Guizani, and A. Rayes, “Software-defined net-
working security: pros and cons,” IEEE Communications Magazine, vol. 53,
no. 6, pp. 73–79, 2015.
[102] S. Hong, L. Xu, H. Wang, and G. Gu, “Poisoning network visibility in software-
defined networks: New attacks and countermeasures.” in NDSS, vol. 15, 2015,
pp. 8–11.
[103] H. Farhady, H. Lee, and A. Nakao, “Software-defined networking: A survey,”
Computer Networks, vol. 81, pp. 79–95, 2015.
[104] A. Khurshid, W. Zhou, M. Caesar, and P. Godfrey, “Veriflow: Verifying
network-wide invariants in real time,” in Proceedings of the first workshop on
Hot topics in software defined networks. ACM, 2012, pp. 49–54.
[105] S. Al-Haj and W. J. Tolone, “Flowtable pipeline misconfigurations in software
defined networks,” in Computer Communications Workshops (INFOCOM WK-
SHPS), 2017 IEEE Conference on. IEEE, 2017, pp. 247–252.
[106] S. Shin, V. Yegneswaran, P. Porras, and G. Gu, “Avant-guard: Scalable and
vigilant switch flow management in software-defined networks,” in Proceedings
of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security.
ACM, 2013, pp. 413–424.
159
[107] S. Shin, P. A. Porras, V. Yegneswaran, M. W. Fong, G. Gu, and M. Tyson,
“Fresco: Modular composable security services for software-defined networks.”
in NDSS, 2013.
[108] D. Kreutz, J. Yu, F. Ramos, and P. Esteves-Verissimo, “Anchor:
logically-centralized security for software-defined networks,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1711.03636, 2017.
[109] S. Lee, C. Yoon, C. Lee, S. Shin, V. Yegneswaran, and P. Porras, “Delta: A
security assessment framework for software-defined networks,” in Proceedings
of NDSS, vol. 17, 2017.
[110] N. McKeown, T. Anderson, H. Balakrishnan, G. Parulkar, L. Peterson, J. Rex-
ford, S. Shenker, and J. Turner, “Openflow: enabling innovation in campus
networks,” ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review, vol. 38, no. 2,
pp. 69–74, 2008.
[111] Y. Li, P. Zhang, L. Ren, and T. Orekan, “A geršgorin theory for robust
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